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ABSTRACT
The proliferation resistance of borosilicate glass was examined and a
process was developed to extract and recover a plutonium analog (thorium)
from borosilicate glass. The glass matrix examined was developed at MIT, and
consisted of the ARM-1 frit (with simulated fission products) loaded with 2 wt.
% thorium and 2 wt. % each of three rare earth elements (Gd, Sm, Eu), which
were added for criticality control and to possibly increase the proliferation
resistance of the glass matrix.
The plutonium analog was recovered from the glass by dissolving the
crushed glass in a 3.8M nitric acid solution at 90'C for 2 hours, and was
subsequently decontaminated using a solvent extraction process. The acid
dissolution process was able to extract 88.4 ± 6.8 % of the plutonium surrogate
from the glass host form. The bench top solvent extraction process was 30.2 _
10.9 % efficient in recovering the plutonium analog as a purified product.
Overall, this process was able to extract 26.7 ± 9.9 % of the plutonium analog
from the glass as a purified product. This process is comparable to the PUREX
process currently used to recover plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.
MCNP was used to determine the compressed critical mass of a plutonium
alloy with the same composition as the product of the extraction process. For
the average product composition, the compressed critical mass was 4.72 kg of
material. The best and worst compositions obtained from this process were 3.30
kg and 8.24 kg, respectively. On average, one compressed critical mass could
be recovered from 696 kg of borosilicate glass, assuming a 2 wt. % plutonium
loading in the glass.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Kevin Wenzel
Title: Assistant Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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1. Introduction
With the end of the cold war and the signing and implementation of the
unilateral disarmament treaties, significant quantities of weapons-grade
plutonium has been declared surplus in both the United States and the former
Soviet Union. Due to the special nature of this material, there is a great deal of
concern regarding its disposition. In the United States, the Department of
Energy has created the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition to decide and
implement the nation's policy on the disposition of the excess plutonium. 1
Currently, the options under consideration for the disposition of surplus
plutonium are burning the plutonium in nuclear reactors, direct geological
disposal of the plutonium, and immobilizing the plutonium by vitrification or
embedding it in a ceramic or other material. 2
Among the numerous solutions to the problem of the disposition of
weapons-grade plutonium is to vitrify the plutonium in borosilicate glass.
Recently, work has been done to determine the feasibility of this option in
order to determine the "optimal" matrix for the long term disposal of the
plutonium 3. However, no work has been done to quantify how the
vitrification option would effect the proliferation resistance of the weapons-
grade plutonium itself.
The primary goal of this work is to determine the proliferation
resistance of weapons-grade plutonium in the borosilicate glass host form
developed here at MIT 4 as compared to the proliferation resistance of
plutonium in other possible host forms. The other potential host forms for the
weapons-grade plutonium would be monazite, Zircon 5, and spent reactor fuel.
1U.S. DOE. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition: FY 95 Program Plan. p. 2. (Ul)
2 ibid. p. 6. (Ul)
3 Sylvester, Kory W. B. A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposition.
MIT. September, 1994. (S5)
4 Borosilicate glass with rare earth elements added. Sylvester, et. al. (S5)
SEwing, R. C., Lutze, et. al. "Zircon: A host-phase for the disposal of weapons
plutonium." Journal of Materials Research. (El)
In order to determine the proliferation resistance of the host forms in
question, it is necessary to conduct various laboratory experiments to
determine how difficult or easy it would be to extract plutonium from the
various host forms. Due to the special nature of plutonium, however, it will be
necessary to use thorium as an analog for the plutonium in the various host
forms. Thorium is known to follow plutonium in current solvent exchange
processes, and has a stable Th(IV) oxidation state which corresponds to the
Pu(IV) state for plutonium. Thorium does not have as many stable oxidation
states as plutonium, and thus can not be used as an analog for plutonium in
REDOX (reduction-oxidation) reactions. Thus, thorium should be more difficult
to extract from the host forms than plutonium would be. As such, if thorium
can be recovered from the host form, then plutonium should also be
recoverable.
First, a literature search was conducted in order to determine the
processes that can be used to extract the thorium from the host forms. Some of
these processes were then be used in the laboratory to determine at least the
following parameters for the borosilicate glass host form:
1) The overall yield of thorium from the separation process,
2) The level of technical sophistication required to
accomplish the specified processing steps,
3) The minimum time required to recover an amount
equivalent to a weapon from a typical log of the host form,
4) The equipment needed for the separation process,
5) The potential for scaling up to a large production facility
Once a method for recovering weapons-usable plutonium from the borosilicate
glass host form was determined, an examination of the relative proliferation
resistance (the resistance to recovery of WGPu from the host form, at least) of
the three primary vitrification options was performed.
This thesis is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 provides the background
information on the politics of plutonium and the disposition option available,
and the technical background on the extraction options for various waste
forms, various decontamination processes, the production of plutonium metal,
and its use in nuclear weapons; Chapter 3 provides a summary of the
experimental work done to determine a process for recovering a plutonium
surrogate from borosilicate glass; Chapter 4 details the analysis of the
extraction process developed to determine the usefulness of the material
recovered, based on MCNP calculations of the compressed critical mass of the
recovered material; and Chapter 5 provides an overall summary of this work,
as well as a discussion of the results, including an evaluation of borosilicate
glass, relative to the spent fuel standard as well as other potential host forms.
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2. Background
Before an evaluation of the proliferation resistance of borosilicate glass
as a host form for weapons-grade plutonium can be attempted, it is necessary
to understand a few things about the politics of the disposition of WGPu. Also,
it may prove helpful to examine how plutonium might be extracted from
various host forms, as well as how it can be purified and fabricated for use in a
nuclear device. This chapter will provide a summary of the political
background surrounding the disposition of WGPu. It will also detail a number
of extraction, decontamination, and reduction processes could be used by a
would-be proliferator to recover the WGPu from various host forms.
2.1 Plutonium
Since it's discovery, plutonium has become one of the most important
elements know to man. Not only can plutonium be used as a fuel for nuclear
power reactors, but it can also be used to build nuclear weapons.
The Pu-239 isotope is the most important isotope, and is produced by the
capture of a neutron by U-238, followed by a series of two beta decays. Higher
isotopes of plutonium are produced by neutron capture in Pu-239. The quality
of the plutonium for use as a weapon (and in a reactor) is determined by the
build-up of these higher isotopes.
2.2 Political background -- "the Plutonium Problem"
As a result of dismantling the nuclear arsenals of the Untied States and
the former Soviet Union, significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile
materials have become surplus to national defense needs. "These stocks of
fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international
security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear
weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety, and health
consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed." 1 It is
estimated that some 60 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu)
will be removed from dismantled nuclear weapons in the United States, and
1U.S. DOE. "OFMD: FY 95 Program Plan". p 1. (Ul)
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another 70 MT from the weapons of the former Soviet Union. 2 "The
Department of Energy has recently stated publicly that 'up to approximately 50
metric tons of plutonium will (or may) become available by about 2005 ... [for]
civilian (unclassified) purposes,' from both weapons and other sources." 3
2.2.1 NAS Report on the Disposition of Plutonium
In 1992, the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on International
Security and Arms Control was asked by the Bush administration for a full-
scale study of the management and disposition of excess weapons plutonium.
The academy recommended that the United States and Russia "pursue long-
term disposition options that:
(a) Minimize the time during which the plutonium is stored in
forms readily usable for nuclear weapons;
(b) preserve material safeguards and security during the
disposition process...
(c) result in a form from which the plutonium would be as
difficult to recover for weapons use as the larger and growing
quantity of plutonium in commercial spent fuel (the spent fuel
standard); and
(d) meet high standards of protection for public and worker
health and for the environment." 4
The most promising alternatives for the disposition of excess weapons
plutonium for achieving these aims are fabrication and use as fuel, without
reprocessing, in existing or modified nuclear reactors; or vitrification in
combination with high level waste. 5 The disposition options proposed by the
NAS were "designed to meet three key security objectives:
2 Miller, M. "Disposal of Weapons Plutonium". Lecture. MIT. April 25, 1995.
(M2)
3NAS report. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. 1994.
p 40. (N1)
4 ibid. p 2. (N1)
5ibid. p 2. (N1)
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(1) to minimize the risk that either weapons or fissile materials
could be obtained by unauthorized parties;
(2) to minimize the risk that weapons or fissile materials could be
reintroduced into the arsenals from which they came... ; and
(3) to strengthen the national and international arms control
mechanisms and incentives to ensure continued arms reductions
and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons." 6
2.2.2 U.S. Effort: Office of Fissile Materials Disposition
On January 24, 1994, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Hazel
O'Leary created the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition and charged it with
the control and disposition of surplus fissile materials and with improving the
coordination of efforts within the DOE concerning these materials.7 The
primary focus of the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) is to
examine "options for placing plutonium...in a form or condition that is
substantially and inherently more difficult to use in a weapons and [to]
achieve this objective in an environmentally safe, secure and verifiable
manner." 8
Currently, the OFMD is examining several broad alternatives for the
disposition of surplus plutonium that either meet or exceed the spent fuel
standard proposed by the National Academy of Sciences. The alternatives for
the disposition of surplus WGPu that are currently under review by the OFMD
that meet the spent fuel standard are (1) burn the WGPu as mixed oxide fuel in
nuclear reactors; (2) immobilize the surplus WGPu by vitrification or
embedding it in a ceramic, with the possible addition of radioactive high-level
waste; and (3) dispose of the material directly in a geological repository.9 The
OFMD is also examining accelerator-based conversion of the plutonium
6NAS report. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. 1994.
p3. (N1)
7 U.S. DOE. "OFMD: FY 95 Program Plan". p 2. (Ul)
8 ibid. p 2. (Ul)
9 ibid.". p 6. (Ul)
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(transmutation) and deep burn reactor technology that would fission most of
the WGPu as options that would exceed the spent fuel standard. 10
Currently, the Office of Fissile Materials is developing a set of criteria
for evaluating the disposition options for surplus WGPu. These criteria will be
used as the basis for comparing specific options for materials disposition. "The
factors to be considered in the screening criteria are as follows: Resistance to
theft or diversion in processing and storage; Resistance to retrieval,
extraction and reuse; Technical viability; Environmental Safety and Health
compliance; Cost effectiveness; Timeliness; Cooperation with Russia and other
countries; Public and institutional acceptance; [and] additional benefits."11
2.3 Vitrification Host Forms
One of the primary options under consideration for the disposition of
WGPu is to immobilize the plutonium by vitrification or embedding it in a
ceramic, either alone or with some added radioactive material (which could be
high-level nuclear waste, cesium, or some other radioisotope), which would
eventually be disposed of in a geologic repository. Three of the possible host
forms for the plutonium are borosilicate glass, zircon, and monazite.
2.3.1 Borosilicate Glass
After decades of research, glass has become the material of choice of
every major country currently involved with immobilizing and isolating
high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The main features of borosilicate glass
that contribute to the acceptability of immobilizing HLW as borosilicate glass
waste forms are its excellent technical performance (good flexibility, high
chemical durability, good mechanical integrity, and high radiation and
thermal stability) and the ease of processing that borosilicate glass affords.
These properties also make the incorporation of plutonium into borosilicate
glass an option for the disposition of surplus WGPu. 12
10 U.S. DOE. "OFMD: FY 95 Program Plan". p 7. (Ul)
11 U.S. DOE. "OFMD: FY 95 Program Plan". pp. 5-6. (Ul)
12 McKibben, et. al. Vitrification of Excess Plutonium. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co. May 1993. p 3. (Ml)
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Vitrification options utilizing borosilicate glass as a product matrix
provide a high degree of nuclear safety, with the plutonium immobilized in an
inert matrix of high chemical durability and enhanced nuclear criticality
resistance, and would serve to meet the primary objective of rendering the
surplus WGPu resistant to diversion and short-term re-assembly into
destructive configurations by a host nation, non-weapons state, or terrorist
group. 1 3 Vitrification options in which the surplus WGPu is vitrified along
with radioactive HLW satisfy the NAS' spent fuel standard for the disposition of
plutonium, as "the task of extracting the plutonium from the glass logs would
be roughly comparable in difficulty to extraction of plutonium from spent fuel
bundles. Moreover, experience with separating materials from such glass is
far less widely disseminated than experience with spent fuel reprocessing." 14
Vitreous substances (substances in the glassy state) may be said to
represent a distinct state of matter, which would be included among the
broader and more general classification of amorphous materials (solids
lacking crystal structure). 15 The most characteristic behavior of glasses is
that they have no heat of fusion. As the temperature rises, a glass eventually
softens and acquires more fluidity, and when a glassy liquid is cooled, the
rigid, elastic condition of ordinary glass is reached without any sudden
change. 16 " For the most part, glasses are solutions of silica and other oxides,
produced by fusion, capable of cooling to ordinary temperatures without
crystallizing, and retaining when cold the general properties of under-cooled
liquids." 17
In work at MIT, Sylvester (S5) experimented with a borosilicate glass
host form for WGPu disposition, based on the Advanced Reference Material frit
(ARM-1), with the addition of thorium and select rare earth elements
(europium, gadolinium, and samarium). ARM-1 is a borosilicate glass that
13 McKibben, et. al. Vitrification of Excess Plutonium. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co. May 1993. p24. (MI)
14NAS report. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium.
1994. p 188. (N1)
15 Scholes, Samuel R. Modern Glass Practice. p 1. (S2)
16 ibid. p 2. (S2)
17 ibid. p 4. (S2)
contains simulated fission products, representative of HLW. Thorium was
added as an analog for plutonium, and the rare earth elements were added for
criticality control as well as increased proliferation resistance. 18 The addition
of 2% by mass thorium oxide (ThO2) and 6% by mass rare earth oxides (2%
Eu203, 2% Sm203, and 2% Gd203) to the ARM-1 glass "caused no visible damage
to the glass (i.e. gross devitrification)." 19 The thorium loading is less than the
solubility limit of thorium in ARM-1 glass (which is less than 10%)20, and was
chosen based on criticality and proliferation resistance concerns.
The glass was prepared using the following procedure. First, measured
amounts of europium, gadolinium, samarium, and thorium nitrate were mixed
in with the ARM-1 frit and heated at 115 0 C in a furnace until melted. The
melt was then poured into a graphite mold and allowed to cool before being
annealed, again in the furnace, at 500,C. 2 1 The composition of the ARM-1 frit
is shown in table 2.1.
The nominal composition of the borosilicate glass matrix used for these
experiments is given in appendix Al. These nominal values were calculated
from the ARM-1 composition (table 2-1) by assuming that the 2 wt. % target
values for the thorium and rare earth oxides were met. (Laboratory notes
would indicate that the composition of the glass, in regards to the added
thorium and rare earths, was fairly close to the target 2 wt. %, provided that
no material was lost during the fabrication process)
1 8Sylvester, Kory W. B. A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposition.
Masters Thesis. MIT. Sept. 1995. pp. 37-51. (S5)
19 ibid. p 62. (S5)
20 ibid. p 63. (S5)
2 1 ibid. p 47. (S5)
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Table 2.1: Pure ARM-1 Composition 22
Table 2.1: This table contains the composition of the ARM-1 frit. The
compositions are given in weight percents (wt. %) for each compound. The
ARM-1 frit (Advanced Resource Material) was developed to simulate fission
product waste vitrified in borosilicate glass.
Component
SiO2
A1203
CaO
TiO2
Na20
B203
Nd203
Li20
ZnO
P205
ZrO2
BaO
MoO3
CeO2
Cs20
SrO
Fraction
46.50%
5.59%
2.23%
3.21%
9.67%
11.30%
5.96%
5.08%
1.46%
0.65%
1.80%
0.66%
1.67%
1.51%
1.16%
0.45%
2.12 Monazite
The mineral monazite is a mixed lanthanide orthophosphate containing
significant amounts of the actinide ions, thorium and uranium. Some deposits
of monazite contain over 15 weight percent (wt. %) uranium oxide and over 14
wt. % thorium oxide. 2 3 This suggests that "the lanthanide orthophosphates
could also incorporate heavier actinides that do not normally occur in nature
but are produced in nuclear reactors," such as plutonium.
2 2the composition of the ARM-1 frit was provided by Pacific National Labs and
is given in Sylvester, A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium
Disposition. p 88. (S5)
2 3 Lutze, Ewing. Radioactive Waste Forms for the Future. 1988. p. 497. (Li)
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"Synthetic monazite appears to be a promising storage medium for
many types of high-level nuclear wastes particularly for those wastes that are
rich in actinides," such as the proposed mixture of surplus WGPu and high-
level nuclear waste. Synthetic monazites can be easily prepared, and have
been shown to be able to incorporate simulated nuclear wastes at significant
waste loadings (up to 20 wt. % simulated defense waste or about 10 wt. %
simulated LWR wastes). 2 4 The monazite matrix provides an incredibly
chemically resistant host matrix2 5 for the disposition of WGPu.
Synthetic monazite has been prepared from the following starting
formulation, using a procedure described in Waste Forms of the Future (L1) 26 .
The initial mixture of 8 grams lanthanum oxide (La203), 2 grams simulated
SRW waste (composition given below in table 2.2), and 0.3 grams of thorium
oxide (ThO2), was dissolved in 150 ml of 50 % nitric acid in water. The solution
was heated to 150TC, and ammonium phosphate [(NH4)2P04] was added.
Following dissolution of the constituents, 450 grams of urea was added and the
resulting solution heated to 250TC. Following the complete evaporation of the
liquids, the resulting powder was calcined at 6000C. A stearic acid binder (1-2
wt. %) was added to the calcined powder, and the mixture was cold-pressed with
a pressure of 1 to 2 kbar. The pellets were then sintered in air at 9000C for 48
hours.
2 4 ibid. p. 558. (Li)
2 5 ibid. p 498. (Li)
2 6 the synthetic monazite production procedure taken from Lutze, W., and
Ewing, R. C. Radioactive Waste Forms for the Future. 1988. p. 518. (LI)
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Table 2.2 - Simulated SRW Waste Composition 2 7
Table 2.2: This table contains the composition of the simulated SRW waste, used
in the production of synthetic monazite.
Component Fraction
Fe(N03)3*9H20 67.5%
Al(NO3)3*9H20 19.2%
Mn 2.3%
CaO 1.0%
Ni(NO3)2*6H20 6.4%
Na2CO3 3.2%
Na2SO4 0.4%
2.3. Zircon
Another proposed host form for surplus WGPu is synthetic Zircon.
"Zircon is an extremely durable phase which may be used as a [plutonium]-
host for the disposal of weapons plutonium. The long-term durability is
confirmed from natural occurrences in diverse and extreme geologic
environments over geologic time.2 8 Zircon occurs in nature with uranium
and thorium concentrations up to 5000 ppm, and is an extremely durable
mineral. 2 9 "Zircon with 9.2 at. % plutonium substituting for [zirconium] has
been synthesized, this is equal to a waste loading of 10 wt. % plutonium." 3 0
Also, several processing options for manufacturing the synthetic Zircon have
been demonstrated on a laboratory scale. 3 1
2 7 Lutze, W., and Ewing, R. C. Radioactive Waste Forms for the Future. 1988. p.
518. (LI)
2 8 Ewing, R. C., et. al. "Zircon: A host-phase for the disposal of weapons
plutonium". Journal of Materials Research. Feb. 1995. p. 245. (El)
2 9 ibid. p. 243. (El)
3 0 ibid. p. 243. (El)
31ibid. p. 245. (El)
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2.4 Extraction Techniques
In order for a would-be proliferator (host nation, non-weapon state, or
sub-national threat (terrorist group)) to recover the plutonium for use in a
nuclear weapon, they must first extract the plutonium from the host form into
solution. This section will examine techniques that could possibly be used to
extract the plutonium from various host forms
2.4.1 Borosilicate Glass
One of the primary reasons that glass waste forms are being considered
as host forms for the disposition of surplus WGPu is that glasses (particularly
borosilicate glass) are fairly chemically resistant. Not only does this mean
that a glass host form will be more resistant to environmental leaching of the
plutonium and/or added HLW components, but it also means that it will be more
difficult to recover the WGPu from the glass host form.
While a great deal of work has been done to make glasses more
chemically resistant, less work has been done on developing techniques to
dissolve the glass. The rate of dissolution of borosilicate glasses is surface area
controlled. 3 2 Most acids will attack borosilicate glass; hydrofluoric (HF) acid
and phosphoric acid (H3PO4) having the strongest effect. 3 3 (Phosphoric acid
at 100 0C results in the loss of 0.014 mg/cm 2 in 24 hours)3 4 Alkali solutions will
also attack borosilicate glasses. A 5 vol. % solution of sodium hydroxide (NaOH)
at 950C resulted in a weight loss from the glass of just over 10 mg/cm2 after 50
hours. 3 5
In examining the use of borosilicate glass as a host form for the
disposition of WGPu, the Plutonium Vitrification Task Group at Savannah River
suggests the following procedure for extracting the plutonium from the
borosilicate glass. After removing the glass log from its container, the
plutonium-loaded glass (either with or without added HLW) would be crushed,
perhaps pulverized. Nitric acid would then be added and heated to 90'C to 95°C
3 2 Shand, E. B. Glass Engineering Handbook. 1958. pp. 80-100. (S3)
33ibid. pp. 80-100. (S3)
34ibid. pp. 80-100. (S3)
35 ibid. p. 95. (S3)
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to dissolve the plutonium. The solution would then be processed to remove the
soluble silicon and undissolved material (using a "head-end gelatin strike" and
centrifugation to remove the "cake" and undissolved material). 3 6
Another possible extraction technique for borosilicate glass is alkali
fusion. One such process is used to determine the boron oxide concentration of
the glass. A 0.25 gram sample of glass is intimately mixed with 2 to 6 grams of
sodium bicarbonate (Na2CO3) in a platinum crucible and heated over a blast
burner until a clear melt is obtained. The crucible is then removed from the
heat and rotated so that the melt solidifies in a thin layer. After the melt has
cooled, the crucible is inverted over a 250 ml Erlenmeyer flask, allowing the
melt to fall into the flask. Adhering material on the lid and on the crucible is
removed with hydrochloric acid (HC1) and hot water, and then washed into the
flask with more water. HC1 is then added to the flask until the melt is dissolved.
After the melt has been dissolved, it is neutralized using sodium hydroxide
(NaOH) or calcium carbonate (CaCO3) until the solution has a pH of
approximately 5. Attach a condenser to the flask, and bring the flask to a boil.
Remove the flask and condenser from the heat and cool. Rinse the fluid from
the condenser back into the flask with a minimal amount of water. Filter the
solution.3 7
2.4.2 Monazite
Monazite is chemically very inert. However, as it is the primary source
of thorium (as well as a source of rare earth elements, zirconium, and
titanium, which are co-recovered along with the thorium) commercial
processes have been developed for "opening up monazite and making its
constituents sufficiently reactive to permit extraction and separation of
thorium, uranium, and rare earths."3 8 The two general methods used are
reaction with hot, concentrated caustic soda solution and dissolution in hot,
concentrated sulfuric acid.
3 6 McKibben, et. al. Vitrification of Excess Plutonium. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co. May 1993. p 7. (Ml)
37 This procedure is taken from Tooley, Fay V. The Handbook of Glass
Manufacture. Vol. II. 1974. pp. 1043-1044. (T1)
3 8Benedict, M., et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981.
p. 299. (B2)
2.4.2.1 Caustic Soda Process 3 9
The monazite sand is ground with water in a ball mill until 96.5% passes
through a 325 mesh and then passed into a stainless steel reactor. A liquid
caustic solution containing 73% sodium hydroxide (NaOH) is fed into the
reactor. The resulting slurry initially contains 1.5 kg of NaOH and 1.7 kg water
per kilogram (kg) of sand. The mixture is then heated to 140'C for 3 hours.
The mixture is then diluted with the wash solution of caustic and trisodium
phosphate (from a later step) and digested for 1 hour at 1050C. The resulting
hot slurry contains practically all the original phosphorous in solution as
trisodium phosphate, and thorium, cerium, and rare earth elements as solid
hydrous metal oxides.
The slurry is then filtered at 80'C, and the raffinate solution is
processed (removing more than 95% of the trisodium phosphate) and recycled
for sand digestion and later neutralization steps. The hydrous cake is brought
into solution by dissolving in 37% hydrochloric acid (1.5 kg/kg sand) at 800C
for 1 hour before diluting the acid solution with water. The thorium is
separated from the rare earths by selective precipitation of thorium hydroxide
at a pH of 5.8, which is effected using the recovered caustic solution.
2A.42.2 Sulfuric Acid Process 4 0
Monazite sands are digested in 93% sulfuric acid (1.56 grams acid per
gram sand, based on 100% sulfuric acid) for 4 hours at 210OC, resulting in a
rubber-like dough that is soluble in cold water. Cold water is added to
solubilize the monazite sulfates (10 grams of water per gram sand), and part of
the resulting solution is decanted.
The monazite sulfate solution is diluted with 4.5 parts by volume of water
and the pH is raised to about 1.5 by adding concentrated ammonium hydroxide.
3 9 the description of the caustic soda process was taken from Benedict, et. al.,
Nuclear Chemical Engineering. 1981. pp. 300-301. (B2)
4 0 the description of the sulfuric acid process was taken from Barghusen and
Smutz, "Processing of Monazite Sands" Ind. Eng. Chem. Dec. 1958. pp.
1754-1755. (Bl)
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The thorium and rare earths are then precipitated as oxalates by adding a 10%
solution of oxalic acid in water. A 10% excess of oxalate ions is added to ensure
complete precipitation. The precipitate is then filtered and washed with an
oxalic acid solution (1% oxalic acid in 0.3 N nitric acid). This precipitation will
separate the thorium and the rare earths from any uranium present in the
monazite, as well as separating the thorium and rare earths from sulfate and
phosphorous ions, which would interfere with the subsequent solvent
extraction separations used to recover the thorium.
The oxalate filter cake is digested directly with 2.5 N sodium hydroxide
solution for 1 hour at 950C. This results in a mixture of thorium and rare earth
hydroxides in a solution of sodium oxalate (done to recover the oxalate). The
hydroxide cake is then washed of sodium oxalate with several batches of hot
water. The resulting cake is then dried at 100'C to 1200C to oxidize the majority
(over 95%) of the cerium in the cerous state to the higher valence state to
allow greater recovery of the cerium in the solvent extraction process (the
cerium is co-recovered with the thorium). For greater recovery of the cerium,
the hydroxide cake must be calcined at 5000C for 1 hour. The resulting
calcined hydroxides are dissolved in 8 N nitric acid (and brought back to 8 N by
the addition of concentrated nitric acid), and then the thorium is extracted
using tributyl phosphate in a solvent extraction process.
2.3 Zircon
Natural zircon is a primary source of zirconium and hafnium. While it is
quite chemically resistant, there are industrial processes for chemically
breaking down the zircon and separating the zirconium and hafnium from the
silicon.4 1 Three of the most important of these processes are chlorination in
the presence of carbon; fusion in alkalis, followed by solution in acid; and
fusion with K2SiF6.
4 1Benedict, M., et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981.
p. 330. (B2)
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2.4.3.1 Chlorination of Zircon 4 2
The chlorination of zircon has been the primary process used in the
U.S., as it produces zirconium chloride. In early plants, the zircon was first
converted to zirconium carbide by reaction with graphite in a graphite-lined
arc furnace at 1800'C. The silicon monoxide is distilled off at this temperature.
The zirconium carbide is then converted to zirconium chloride by
chlorination at 5000C. The modern process directly chlorinates a mixture of
zircon and carbon at 500 0C to form zirconium chloride, silicon chloride, and
carbon monoxide.
2.4.3.2 Alkali Fusion 4 3
The alkali-fusion process was developed by the Ames Laboratory of the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Zircon sand is mixed with from 1 to 1.5 times
its weight of sodium hydroxide (NaOH), and the mixture is heated in a furnace
at 5650C. The sodium hydroxide melts at 3180 C, and as the temperature rises,
the NaOH reacts with the zircon to form Na2ZrO3, Na2SiO3, and water. The
water is evolved as steam, and the remaining mixture is eventually converted
to a fragile, porous solid frit as the temperature reaches 5300C. The frit is then
cooled, ground, and leached with water to extract the Na2SiO3. The residue is
then leached with acid, dissolving the Na2ZrO3, leaving the unreacted zircon to
be re-used.
2.4.3.3 Fluosilicate Fusion 44
Fluosilicate fusion has been used in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to
produce feed for the fractional crystallization separation of zirconium from
hafnium. In this process, the zircon is ground to pass 200 mesh and mixed
with potassium fluosilicate and potassium chloride. The mixture is sintered in
a rotary furnace at 650'C to 7000C to form K2ZrF6 and silicon dioxide. The
sinter is then cooled and ground to pass 100 mesh before it is leached with 1 %
4 2 Taken from Benedict, et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill,
Inc. 1981. p. 331. (B2)
4 3 Taken from Benedict, et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill,
Inc. 1981. pp. 331-332. (B2)
4 4 Taken from Benedict, et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill,
Inc. 1981. p. 333. (B2)
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hydrochloric acid (HC1) at 85'C. The product is then filtered at 80'C before it is
cooled to crystallize the K2ZrF6 and K2HfF6.
2.5 Decontamination Techniques
Once the host form has been 'cracked' and the plutonium has been
brought into solution, it will be necessary to decontaminate (purify the
plutonium by removing other components from the feed stream) the
plutonium before it is suitable for use in a weapon. There are three general
types of decontamination techniques: chemical, solvent extraction, and ion
exchange. All three of these techniques could potentially be used to obtain an
essentially pure plutonium stream (which could then be fabricated into a
metal for use in a weapon).
2. Chemistry of Plutonium
Plutonium is a man-made, transuranic element with atomic number 94.
The most stable oxidation state for plutonium is the Pu(IV) state.4 5 In aqueous
solution, plutonium can exist in the five oxidation states: Pu(III), Pu (IV),
Pu(V), Pu(VI), and Pu(VII). Due to the small differences in oxidation potentials
of Pu(III) through Pu(VI), all of,the first four oxidation states can exist
simultaneously in solution.4 6
2.5.2 Chemical Decontamination Techniques
During the Manhattan project, a number of possible chemical
decontamination processes were developed in an attempt to obtain pure
plutonium. Most of these processes separate the plutonium through the use of
alternating oxidation and reduction stages. Before designing the first
plutonium extraction plant, the plutonium chemistry group considered the
following processes:4 7
4 5 Benedict, M., et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981.
p. 436. (B2)
4 6 ibid. p. 436. (B2)
4 7 Kathren, R. L., et. al., ed. The Plutonium Story: The lournals of Prof. Glenn
T. Seaborg. p. 241 (Ki)
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2.5.2.1 Sodium Uranyl Acetate Method 4 8
Sodium acetate and sodium nitrate are added to an 11 % uranyl nitrate
(UNH) solution (this was a solution of uranium that had been irradiated to
produce plutonium) to precipitate all of the uranium as sodium uranyl acetate,
leaving the plutonium in solution in its reduced state. The plutonium is then
oxidized and precipitated using a 5 % sodium uranyl acetate solution. More
than 98% of the plutonium and only about 1% of the fission activity
precipitates with this step.
2.5.2.2 Bismuth Phosphate Method
The original design of the process, created during the Manhattan
Project, was as follows. First, the plutonium, in its reduced form, is co-
precipitated with bismuth phosphate from a 20 % UNH solution, with a yield of
approximately 98 % of the plutonium and 7 % of the gamma activity. The
precipitation was done at 70'C from a solution of 1 N sulfuric acid (H2SO4). The
resulting bismuth phosphate may be dissolved in nitric (HNO3) or
hydrochloric acid (HC1). From a HC1 solution, the plutonium can be
precipitated with lanthanum fluoride and a wet fluoride red-ox cycle may be
carried out (see lanthanum fluoride cycle, [6.2.1.X]). 4 9
The bismuth phosphate cycle was improved and used as the first large-
scale extraction process. The current process, as described by Katz, Seaborg,
and Morss (K2) is described below. NaNO2 is added to the dissolver solution to
adjust the plutonium to the Pu(IV) state, while setting the neptunium to the
Np(V) state and leaving the uranium in the U(VI) state. Sulfate is also added
before the first extraction to complex the uranium and prevent the
precipitation of the uranium along with the plutonium. The plutonium is then
precipitated along with bismuth phosphate, leaving the uranium, neptunium,
and part of the fission products in the supernant solution. 5 0
4 8 Taken from Taken from Kathren, R. L., et. al., ed. The Plutonium Story: The
journals of Prof. Glenn T. Seaborg. p. 241 (Ki)
4 9 Original bismuth phosphate cycle description taken from Taken from
Kathren, R. L., et. al., ed. The Plutonium Story: The Journals of Prof,
Glenn T. Seaborg. p. 241 (K1)
5 0 The bismuth phosphate cycle is taken from Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The
Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. 1986. pp. 512-515. (K2)
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The bismuth phosphate precipitate is dissolved in concentrated nitric
acid, and the plutonium is oxidized to Pu (VI) using a strong oxidant (sodium
bismuthate, potassium permanganate, or potassium dichromate). A by-product
bismuth phosphate precipitation at this stage carries the fission products,
leaving the plutonium, as PuO2 2 +, in the supernant solution. The plutonium is
then reduced to the Pu (IV) state using Fe2 + , and another precipitation is made
(beginning the cycle again). As some of the fission products follow the
plutonium through the bismuth phosphate cycle, a 'cross-over' red-ox cycle is
used, such as the lanthanum fluoride process (see lanthanum fluoride cycle,
[2.5.2.6])51
2.5.2.3 Adsorption Method 5 2
Plutonium in a reduced form in a 10% UNH solution (post irradiation) is
passed through a column of diatomaceous earth. This removes all of the
plutonium, 5 % of the uranium, and 15 % of the fission products from the
solution. The column is washed with 5 N nitric acid, during which the leading
edge will remove the plutonium together with the uranium and less than 2 %
of the original fission product gamma activity.
2.5.2.4 Crystallization Method 5 3
The uranyl nitrate solution (UNH), with the plutonium in a reduced state
and with an excess of nitric acid, is cooled from 60TC to room temperature with
stirring. This results in the crystallization of the UNH, and results in the
concentration of approximately 85% of the plutonium in the liquid phase. By a
three stage, counter-current process, 99 % of the plutonium can be
concentrated with only 8 - 12 % of the uranium. The fission product
concentrations in these stages are not known. This process was regarded as
unreliable by Seaborg and the plutonium chemistry team.
5 1Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. 1986. pp.
512-515. (K2)
5 2 Taken from Kathren, R. L., et. al., ed. The Plutonium Story: The Journals of
Prof. Glenn T. Seaborg. p. 241 (Kl)
5 3 Taken from Kathren, R. L., et. al., ed. The Plutonium Story: The Journals of
Prof. Glenn T. Seaborg. p. 241 (Ki)
27
2.5.2.5 Iodate Method 54
Plutonium in a reduced form is co-precipitated with thorium iodate from
a 10 % UNH solution. The precipitate carries more than 95 % of the plutonium
with less than 5 % of the uranium and 20 % of the fission products. The
thorium iodate precipitate is separated by centrifuge and dissolved readily in
dilute HC1. The plutonium is then oxidized by means of the addition of
dichromate ions and a second thorium iodate precipitation is made. This leaves
the plutonium in an oxidized state with approximately 5 % of the uranium and
5 % of the fission product gamma activity.
2.5.2.6 Lanthanum Fluoride process 5 5
Another process developed during the Manhattan project to separate
plutonium for use in nuclear weapons is the lanthanum fluoride process.
Starting with uranium, plutonium, and fission products in a uranyl nitrate
solution, the uranium is removed by extraction with diethyl ether. This leaves
the plutonium in the Pu(IV) state in the aqueous phase, along with the bulk of
the fission products. Lanthanum and fluoride ions are added to the aqueous
phase, precipitating lanthanum fluoride, which carries the plutonium and
some of the fission products. The lanthanum fluoride is now solubilized by
either fuming with sulfuric acid, dissolution in 1 M nitric acid (saturated with
H3BO3 or Al(NO3)3), or conversion to lanthanum hydroxide (which is soluble
in nitric acid). The plutonium is then oxidized with a strong oxidizer before a
second lanthanum phosphate precipitation is made by adding more fluoride
ions. The plutonium will remain in the supernant solution as PuO2 2 +. If
further decontamination is wanted, the plutonium can be reduced and the
cycle repeated.
5 4Taken from Kathren, R. L., et. al., ed. The Plutonium Story: The lournals of
Prof. Glenn T. Seaborg. p. 241 (Ki)
5 5 The lanthanum fluoride process is taken from Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The
Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. 1986. pp. 511-512. (K2)
28
2.5.3 Solvent Extraction Techniques
"Plutonium can be extracted from aqueous solution into any one of a
number of water-immiscible organic liquids." 5 6 The extraction of plutonium
from fission products by solvent extraction depends on the differences in
extractability of the various oxidation states into the organic phase. 5 7 "For the
most part, solvent extraction is applied to nitrate systems, since strongly
complexing anions, such as sulfate, phosphate, fluoride, or oxalate, tend to
maintain plutonium and the actinide elements in the aqueous phase and thus
hinder extraction." 5 8
The Purex (Plutonium Uranium Reduction EXtraction) process is widely
used to extract plutonium and uranium from reprocessed spent fuel. The Purex
process uses tributyl phosphate (TBP), in a hydrocarbon diluent, to extract
uranyl nitrate and tetravalent plutonium nitrate from an aqueous solution
containing nitric acid. 59 The Purex process, on a plant-scale, has a
decontamination factor of 2*104 for the decontamination of fission products
from plutonium in the first cycle, and 2*103 for the second cycle.6 0 (the
decontamination factor is the ratio of the concentration of a given
contaminant, relative to the concentration of plutonium, before the
decontamination step to the relative concentration before the
decontamination step. Thus, the decontamination factor is ratio by which the
relative concentration of a given element is reduced by a given process).
In the Purex process, as it is used in reprocessing, the spent fuel,
containing plutonium and fission products, is de-cladded and dissolved in hot
nitric acid. The acidity of the solution is adjusted to a pH of 2.5, and the
plutonium is brought to its most extractable valence of 4, by the controlled
addition of N204 (formerly, sodium nitrite was used). The uranium and
plutonium are then separated from more than 99 percent of the fission
5 6 Katz, et.al. The Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. p. 516 (K2)
5 7 ibid. p. 518 (K2)
5 8 ibid. p. 516 (K2)
5 9 Benedict, M., et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981.
p. 4 61. (B2)
6 0 Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. p. 534
(K2)
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products by solvent extraction with a 30 vol. % solution of TBP in a paraffinic
hydrocarbon diluent. The plutonium is then separated from the uranium by
reducing the plutonium to the less extractable valence of 3. The plutonium
can be further purified by repeating the Purex cycle. 6 1
2.5.4 Ion Exchange Techniques
Plutonium in any of its oxidation states is readily taken up by cation-
exchange resins from dilute aqueous solutions, and Pu(IV) and Pu(VI) for
anionic complexes in hydrochloric and nitric acid solutions. Consequently,
both anion and cation exchange techniques can be used for the separation and
purification of plutonium from other actinides and rare-earth elements.6 2
"Ion-exchange techniques based on nitrate media are of major
importance in the recovery and purification of plutonium from impurities.
Both anion- and cation-exchange procedures in nitrate media have been
reported." 6 3 At Los Alamos, nitrate ion-exchange is routinely used to separate
and purify large quantities of plutonium, up to kilogram amounts. The
plutonium is adjusted to Pu(IV) and the feed solution is brought to the desired
nitric acid concentration (around 7 M). The solution is then sorbed on Dowex 1
x 4 resin (50-100 mesh). The column is washed with 7 M nitric acid to remove
impurities before the plutonium is eluted with 0.3 M NH2OH*HNO3. Except for
Pd, Ir, Pt, Au, and Th, all other elements are separated effectively, with
decontamination factors of greater than 1000.64
A cation-exchange process based on nitrate has also been developed and
used at Oak Ridge and Savannah River. In this process, the plutonium is
reduced to Pu(III) and the solution adjusted to 0.25 M nitric acid. The solution
is then loaded on a cation-exchange resin. Uranium is eluted from the resin
with 0.25 M sulfuric acid / 0.25 M hydroxylamine sulfate, and then the
6 1Taken from Benedict, et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill,
Inc. 1981. pp. 466-468. (B2)
6 2 Katz, et. al. The Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. p. 550 (K2)
6 3 ibid. p. 553 (K2)
6 4 ibid. p. 557. (K2)
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plutonium is stripped back using 5.7 M nitric acid / 0.3 M NH2SO3H. The
column is then regenerated using 0.1 M nitric acid / 0.1 M NH2SO3H. 6 5
2A Fabrication of Plutonium Metal
Numerous techniques for obtaining plutonium metal from a plutonium
nitrate solution have been developed. The plutonium nitrate can be converted
either to plutonium dioxide or to intermediate compounds suitable for
reduction to plutonium metal. Plutonium nitrate can be directly decomposed
(thermally) to plutonium dioxide but the plutonium nitrate feed solution must
be very pure. Industrial-scale operations usually begin by the precipitation
of plutonium peroxide or plutonium oxalate, resulting in further
decontamination. 6 6
2.6.1 Plutonium peroxide precipitation process 6 7
Plutonium nitrate solutions of any oxidation state can be used as the feed
for peroxide precipitation, as the plutonium will be converted to the Pu(IV)
state by the hydrogen peroxide. A solution of 30 to 50 percent hydrogen
peroxide (H202) is added slowly to the plutonium-nitric acid solution, using
about 3 peroxide oxygen atoms per plutonium atom. The precipitation is
carried out at low temperatures, about 30'C or less, to minimize the
decomposition of the peroxide. The Savannah River plant performs the
precipitation at 150C, followed by digestion at 60C. The filtered plutonium
peroxide cake can be calcined at 150'C to form plutonium dioxide, although a
final temperature of 900'C is required to form stoichiometric plutonium
dioxide. Typical decontamination factors obtained through the peroxide
precipitation process are greater that 6.7 for sodium, 25 for boron, greater
than 5 for lanthanum, almost 60 for cerium (58.8) and about 1.06 for
thorium.6 8
6 5 Katz, et. al. The Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. p. 562. (K2)
6 6 Benedict, M., et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981.
p. 440. (B2)
6 7 Plutonium peroxide precipitation process taken from Benedict, M., et. al.
Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981. pp. 441-442.
(B2) with the exception of the decontamination factors.
6 8Decontamination factors calculated from data presented in Katz, Seaborg,
and Morss. The Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. p. 571 (K2)
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2.2 Plutonium (IV) oxalate precipitation process 6 9
Tetravalent plutonium oxalate can be precipitated from a nitric acid
solution of Pu(IV) nitrate by the following process. First, the plutonium is
adjusted to the Pu(IV) state by the addition of hydrogen peroxide, whether
before or during the addition of oxalic acid. Best precipitations occur at
temperatures between 500C and 60 0C and for time periods of oxalic acid
addition between 10 and 60 minutes. The nitric acid concentration of the
solution must be adjusted such that the final slurry concentration is between
1.5 and 4 M HNO3 in order to minimize the co-precipitation of impurities and to
maximize the effectiveness of the plutonium precipitation. The slurry is then
filtered to recover the oxalate cake (containing the plutonium). The oxalate
cake is then calcined at 300'C, followed by a restructuring at 900'C to form
stoichiometric plutonium dioxide (PuO2).
As compared with peroxide precipitation, the oxalate process achieves
less decontamination from impurities, but the solutions and solids are more
stable and safer to handle. The plutonium (IV) oxalate precipitation process
achieves a decontamination factor of 3-6 for zirconium and niobium; 12 for
ruthenium; 100 for aluminum, chromium, and nickel; 60 for uranium; and a
decontamination factor of 1 for americium and thorium.7 0
2.6.3 Calcination of Pu(NO3_4 7 1
The need for an intermediate precipitation process can be avoided by
the direct calcination of the plutonium nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide
(PuO2). The calcination has been carried out at 3500C in a liquid-phase screw
calciner, with half a mole of ammonium sulfate added to the feed solution per
mole of plutonium in order to increase the production of reactive PuO2. As the
6 9 Plutonium(IV) oxalate precipitation process taken from Benedict, M., et. al.
Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981. p. 442. (B2)
with the exception of the decontamination factors.
7 0 Decontamination factors taken from in Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The
Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. p. 569 (K2)
7 1the direct calcination of plutonium nitrate process was taken from Benedict,
M., et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981. p.
443. (B2)
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direct calcination of plutonium nitrate does not involve any chemical
separations, the process will not provide any decontamination of the
plutonium from any impurities in the nitrate solution. As such, a very pure
plutonium nitrate solution is desired for this process.
2.6.4 Production of Plutonium Metal
One of the many techniques that have been developed for the
production of plutonium metal is the thermochemical reduction of plutonium
dioxide to plutonium metal. Elements that have been considered for reducing
plutonium dioxide are hydrogen, sodium, and calcium. When choosing a
reducing agent, it is important to consider that the reaction must be
sufficiently exothermic that the reacting mixture will self-heat to the
temperature range of 1500 K.7 2 "The thermodynamically favorable reduction
of PuO2 with calcium has the disadvantage that the CaO co-product is not
molten, so that the resulting plutonium metal and unreacted calcium metal
remain finely dispersed throughout the slag. However, the dispersed
plutonium can be recovered as a massive metal by preferentially extracting
the calcium oxide and unreacted calcium with molten calcium chloride at
temperatures above the melting points of plutonium and calcium, leaving
consolidated plutonium metal with yield efficiencies in excess of 99.9
percent." 7 3
2.7 Weapon Design
A nuclear weapon functions by taking a fissile material (U-235 or Pu-
239 in most designs) in a sub-critical state and quickly forcing it into a super-
critical state. This can be accomplished by increasing the density of the fuel,
usually by implosion using conventional explosives. Once a super-critical
state is reached, the weapon will release energy at an exponentially
increasing rate until the expansive forces generated cause disassembly of the
super-critical state into a sub-critical state again and the release of the energy
liberated by the nuclear chain reaction stops.
7 2Benedict, M., et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981.
p. 447. (B2)
7 3Benedict, M., et. al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981.
p. 447. (B2)
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In order for a weapon to achieve a super-critical state, however, it must
contain at least enough fissile material to sustain a chain reaction. This
amount of fissile material is referred to as a critical mass. The amount of
fissile material required to build a nuclear device will be at least one critical
mass or more. For example, the weapon design for the Trinity test (the first
plutonium implosion weapon test) used three critical masses7 4 to fuel the
nuclear reaction.
The minimum, water reflected critical mass for a pure Pu-239 metal
sphere is 5.425 kg.7 5 Due to neutron capture in Pu-239 as it is produced in
nuclear reactor fuel, there will be some level of higher plutonium isotopes
present, which will tend to increase this minimum critical mass since the
higher plutonium isotopes act as poisons to the chain reaction.
The relative enrichment of these higher isotopes determines the quality
of the plutonium. Plutonium is considered to be weapons-grade if it is
composed of greater than 94% Pu-239, while reactor-grade plutonium is
typically composed of less than 80% Pu-239. 7 6 Typical isotopics of reactor-
grade (RGPu) and weapons-grade (WGPu) are presented below in table 2.3.
7 4 Sylvester, K. A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposition. p. 43 (S5)
7 5 Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The Chemistry of the Actinide Elements. p. 502
(K2)
7 6 DeVolpi A. Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, Ann. Rev.
Nucl. Part. Sci., V36, 1986. pp. 83-114. (Dl)
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Table 2.3: Typical Plutonium Isotope Composition
Table 2.3: This table contains typical isotopic concentrations for weapons-
grade plutonium (WGPu) and reactor-grade plutonium (RGPu).
% 2 3 8 Pu
% 2 3 9 Pu
% 2 4 0 Pu
% 2 4 1Pu
% 2 4 2 Pu
WGPu 7 7
0.012
93.9
5.81
0.23
0.22
RGPu 7 8
1.31
60.8
24.5
8.37
5.04
7 7 Normalized isotopics for WGPu taken from Berkhout, F., et al. Disposition of
Separated Plutonium. Science and Global Security. Vol. 3. 1992. p. 13
(B3)
78 Normalized isotopics for RGPu taken from Plutonium Fuel: An Assessment.
OECD. Paris. 1989. p. 50. (01)
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3. Technical Investigation
3.1 Scope
One of the major questions about vitrifying WGPu is how difficult would
it be for a would-be proliferator to recover the material from the borosilicate
glass host form. In this work, this issue was examined through laboratory
experiments on a borosilicate glass host form under investigation here at MIT.
This host form used the ARM-1 frit (with simulated fission products), with the
addition of thorium (Th) as an analog for the WGPu. Rare earth elements
(europium (Eu), gadolinium (Gd), and samarium (Sm)) were also added to the
glass for criticality control as well as to potentially increase the proliferation
resistance of the host form.
The task of recovering the WGPu from the host form was broken down
into three stages: extraction, decontamination, and fabrication. The
extraction stage involves extracting the WGPu analog from the host form into
solution. The WGPu is then purified for use in a nuclear weapon in the
decontamination stage. Finally, the WGPu is fabricated into metal for use in a
weapon. The extraction and decontamination stages were examined
experimentally in this work. Initial scoping experiments were performed to
determine which techniques were the most successful for each stage, and then
these techniques were examined in more detail. The fabrication of plutonium
metal from aqueous solutions is fairly well established, and has been detailed
in section 2.6 of this work.
3.2 General Laboratory Procedures
Unless otherwise noted, the following procedures were used in the
experiments performed for this work.
32 Concentration Measurements
The elemental concentrations of liquid samples were determined using
Inductively Coupled Plasma (ICP) flame spectroscopy. The samples were first
filtered with a 0.45 p. m filter, and then acidified to at least 5 volume % (vol. %)
nitric acid. The samples were then analyzed on the Spectroflame ICP, using
the measurement parameters and equipment settings describe in appendix C2.
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The average of the 3 concentration measurements was used as the
solution concentration. A brief description of how the ICP works is included
in the appendix (appendix Cl1). The laboratory ICP operations document has
also been included here, in appendix C4.
For the single element determinations (thorium only, done for the
scoping experiments for the extraction process), the Thorium concentrations
were measured by observing the 283.73 nm line. For the multi-elemental
analyses, the lines used for each element are provided in table 3.1. The
elements examined in this work were chosen for the following reasons.
Thorium, and to some extent cerium, were chosen because they can serve as an
analog for plutonium (thorium is used in this work as the plutonium analog).
The rare earths (europium, gadolinium, samarium, and neodymium) were
included due to their large cross sections as well as to determine the effect
these elements have on the proliferation resistance of the glass host form.
Sodium and silicon were included in order to gain some understanding of what
is happening to the glass itself, as both elements are primary components in
the glass. Boron was included not only because it was a major component of
the glass, but also due to its large cross section. Finally cesium was included so
that it would be possible to observe the intensity of the radiation barrier
throughout the processes.
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Table 3.1: Characteristic Photon Lines Used for ICP Analysis
Table 3.1: This table contains the characteristic photon lines used to determine
the concentrations of the listed elements by ICP analysis
element
cerium (Ce)
thorium (Th)
europium (Eu)
gadolinium (Gd)
samarium (Sm)
neodymium (Nd)
cesium (Cs)
silicon (Si)
sodium (Na)
boron (B)
line used
418.66 nm
283.73 nm
381.97 nm
342.25 nm
359.26 nm
401.23 nm
455.53 nm
250.69 nm
589.59 nm
249.68 nm
3.22. Acid Concentrations
As a convention for this work, the concentrations of the acid solutions
used are given in terms of the volume percent concentrated acid solution used
to make the solution. Thus, a 5 vol. % solution of nitric acid is a solution of 5
vol. % concentrated nitric acid solution in de-ionized water (DI water).
The concentrated stock solution of nitric acid which was used for these
experiments was 70.5 wt. % HNO3, or 15.5 M HNO3 (based on laboratory density
measurements of stock concentrated nitric acid solution). Thus, the 5 vol. %
solutions used in most experiments are actually 0.78 M HNO3.
32.3 Equipment Cleaning
All glassware (and plasticware) was cleaned using the following
protocol. If no organic solutions were used with the equipment, it was allowed
to soak overnight in a 0.5 M HNO3 solution (the contaminated bath). It was
then rinsed with DI water and placed into another bath containing 0.5 M HNO3.
The glassware was then dried for use.
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If organic solutions were used with the glassware, the glassware would
first be rinsed with acetone, then with ethyl alcohol, and finally with DI water
before being placed into the first acid bath.
Vials used for sample storage were never re-used, and thus were not
subject to the above cleaning process.
3.2.4 Glass Sample Composition and Designations
The glass samples used in these experiments were made by K. Sylvester
as part of his thesis work (Sylvester, Ref. [S5]). The nominal composition of
the glass is given in appendix Al. The actual composition of the glass (not
accounting for any volatilization of components while the glass was being
made) can be found in the experimental work done by Sylvester as part of his
thesis work (S5). The actual compositions were usually within 1-3% of the
nominal composition detailed in appendix Al. The batch in which the glass
was made is designated by T1Px, where T1 indicates that the glass was made by
using the ARM-1 glass as the frit and the Px (x being any number) indicates
the batch number. The batches were all made the same way and have
approximately equal composition (within 1-2% of the nominal values for the
added elements). However, there may be some inhomogeneity between
batches due to heterogeneity in the ARM-1 glass used as frit.
3.2.5 Definition of Parameters Used
Defined below are the parameters used in this work. The thorium subscript
(Th) was typically dropped for simplicity. Therefore, in the body of this work,
the lack of a subscript on a term (i.e. CF) would mean that the given factor is
determined relative to thorium.
3.2.5.1 Extraction Efficiency (eth, ei)
The extraction efficiency of a process (ei) is defined to be the ratio of
the mass of a given element in solution to the mass of that element in the glass.
This parameter is a measure of the effectiveness of a given extraction process.
Of particular importance is the extraction efficiency of thorium (eth), which
is used as an analog to the WGPu in the glass. Unless specified elsewhere, the
concentration of a given element in the borosilicate glass matrix was assumed
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to be the nominal value (see Appendix Al) for determining the extraction
efficiency.
mass of Th recovered in solution (3.1)
mass of Th in the glass
3.2.5.2 Recovery Efficiency (rth, ri)
The recovery efficiency of a process (ri) is defined to be the ratio of the
mass of a given element in the product stream (final solution) to the mass of
the same element in the feed stream (initial solution). This parameter is used
to measure the efficiency of a decontamination process. The most used
recovery efficiency in this work was the recovery efficiency of thorium
(rth):
mass of Th recovered in product stream < 1 (3.2)
Smass of Th in the feed stream
3.2.5.3 Process Efficiency (Pth)
The process efficiency for thorium is defined to be the ratio of the total
mass of thorium in the final product to the total mass of thorium in the host
form (in this case, in the borosilicate glass. Again, nominal glass compositions
were used). The process efficiency is a measure of the efficiency of the entire
process, from the initial extraction to the production of the final product. If
the final product is a partially decontaminated nitrate solution of WGPu, then
the process efficiency is simply the product of the extraction efficiency of the
extraction phase and the recovery efficiency of the decontamination phase.
Smass of Th recovered in product < (3.3)
Pth mass of Th in the host form
Pth = eth x rth 5 1 (3.3a)
3.2.5.4 Contamination Factor (CFi)
The contamination factor of a given solution or form is defined as the
ratio of the mass of element i to the mass of thorium (typically). If the
contamination factor is to be calculated relative to a different element, it will
be explicitly stated. The contamination factor provides a measure of the
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relative concentrations of a given contaminant relative to the plutonium
analog (Th).
CF mass of element i in solution (34)CFi = (3.4)
mass of thorium in solution
3.2.5.5 Decontamination Factor (DFi)
The decontamination factor of a given process is defined as the ratio of
the contamination factor (CFi) in the feed stream to the contamination factor
in the product stream for a given element. This provides a metric for the
effectiveness of a given process in reducing the relative amount of a given
contaminant. A decontamination factor greater than 1.0 indicates that the
relative concentration of a given contaminant (as compared with thorium)
has been reduced.
DF - CFi of Feed stream
D CFi of Product stream (35)
3.3 Overview of Experimental Work
The experimental work described here was performed between March
and December of 1995 at MIT. A detailed account of the experiments is provided
in appendix B.
The task of recovering weapons-usable plutonium metal from a host
form, such as borosilicate glass, can be broken into three sub-tasks:
extraction, decontamination or purification, and reduction to metal. The
experimental work of this thesis, which was the recovery of a plutonium
analog (thorium), can also be divided into these three tasks. The reduction of
to metal was not undertaken as part of this work.
3.3.1 Extraction
Two methods were examined for extracting thorium (as an analog for
plutonium) from borosilicate glass: acid dissolution and alkali fusion. While
both methods were to some extent successful in extracting the thorium, acid
dissolution proved to be more efficient and simpler than alkali fusions. The
alkali fusion techniques examined were able to extract between 40 % to 50 % of
the thorium from the glass, while the acid dissolution technique was able to
extract more than 80 % [B.1]. Both techniques required that the glass be
crushed into a powder in order to extract a significant amount of thorium from
the glass.
3.3.2 Decontamination
Once the decision to use acid dissolution for the extraction of thorium
from borosilicate glass was made, the thorium-containing solutions generated
by the acid dissolution experiments were used to examine a number of
decontamination processes. Two types of process were examined:
precipitation processes and solvent extraction processes.
Three different precipitation processes were examined: hydroxide
precipitation, fluoride precipitation, and phosphate precipitation. The
hydroxide precipitation process was based on the final decontamination step of
the caustic soda method for extracting thorium from monazite [2.5.2.1]. The
fluoride and phosphate precipitation processes mimic the initial stages of the
lanthanum fluoride [2.6.1.6] and bismuth phosphate [2.6.1.2] decontamination
processes. However, as thorium does not have the same oxidation states as
plutonium, it was not possible to do the REDOX reactions required for complete
decontamination of the rare earths and fission products. The recovery
efficiencies (rth) and decontamination factors (DF) for these three processes,
as well as for a 2 cycle hydroxide precipitation process, are shown in table 3.2
In addition to precipitation decontamination processes, a solvent
extraction was examined as a technique for purifying the thorium stream. The
experiments done here were based on the PUREX process [2.6.2.1], which is
currently used at most reprocessing plants worldwide. The process basically
consists of contacting the acidified thorium-containing solution with a 30 vol.
% solution of TBP (Tri-Butyl Phosphate) in kerosene, which preferentially
absorbs the thorium (and plutonium), leaving most other components behind.
The thorium is then stripped from the organic using DI water. The one-cycle
process did just that. Then, an acid wash stage was added to the process, in
which the thorium-loaded organic was contacted with 3M nitric acid to
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increase the decontamination of the rare earths from the thorium. This was
referred to as the acid wash stage, and this variation of the solvent extraction
process was called the 1+1 extraction.
In addition to the one cycle and 1+1 solvent extraction process
experiments were also done with a 2 cycle solvent extraction process, in which
the final product solution was acidified to 3M HNO3 and then used as the feed
solution to another cycle of solvent extraction. Two variants of the 2-cycle
solvent extraction process were examined: one using fresh organic solvent
each cycle, the other recycling the organic solution from the first cycle for
use in the second cycle. It is important to note that the organic solution was
not pre-equilibrated with nitric acid before these experiments.
Table 3.2: Precipitation Process Decontamination Factors
Table 3.2: This table contains the decontamination factors (DF) and recovery
efficiencies (rth) for the hydroxide precipitation process (OH), fluoride
precipitation process (F), phosphate precipitation process (P04), and 2 cycle
hydroxide precipitation process (2*OH).
element OH F P4 2*OH
Ce 3.14 0.24 0.78 2.51
Eu 1.27 0.48 0.73 1.42
Gd 1.31 0.62 0.75 1.47
Sm 1.36 0.33 0.72 1.49
Nd 1.93 0.49 0.75 1.88
Si 0.87 0.21 14.23 0.23
Na 53.24 0.99 27.94 612.13
B 4.41 8.20 19.48 136.23
rth 49.3% 10.9% 25.3% 42.5%
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Table 3.3: Solvent Extraction Decontamination Processes
Table 3.3: This table contains the decontamination factors (DF) and recovery
efficiencies (rth) for the solvent extraction experiments performed: the one
cycle extraction (1-cycle), the one cycle with acid wash (1+1) the 2 cycle
extraction without recycle (2-cycle), and the 2 cycle extraction process with
recycled solvent (recycle).
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Si
Na
B
1 Cycle
17.69
9.06
9.69
9.29
12.97
<50.0
26.39
31.58
47.2%
1+1
88.00
28.92
29.54
22.82
32.42
10.17
37.77
67.82
29.2%
2-Cycle
17.53
8.63
9.39
9.47
14.00
82.35
20.04
23.09
10.2%
Recycle
17.47
11.35
11.91
12.01
14.25
31.73
18.31
19.44
19.7%
3,3,3 Crushed Glass - Acid Dissolution Process (V2)
The final procedure chosen for the extraction and decontamination of
thorium from borosilicate glass consists of an acid dissolution extraction
process coupled with a 1+1 solvent extraction (1 cycle with and acid wash of
the solvent). The final version of the Crushed glass - Acid dissolution, or CA
(V2), process is
1) The glass sample was crushed using a ceramic mortar and
pestle so that it passes through a 60 mesh filter (particle size less
than 250 microns)
2) The crushed glass was put in a beaker and a 25 vol. % solution
of nitric acid (approximately 17.87 wt. % HNO3) was added in a 30:1
mass ratio (acid:glass).
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3) The sample was stirred and covered with a watch glass before
being placed in the oven.
4) The samples were then heated in an oven for 2 hours at 900C.
Every 30 minutes, the samples were removed from the oven for
stirring.
5) After 2 hours, the samples were weighed and then the liquid
solution was decanted off using a disposable pipette leaving the
undissolved glass in the beaker. A small portion of this sample
was taken, filtered and diluted for ICP analysis.
6) The remaining sample was then added to a glass bottle
(shaker) and mixed with an equal volume of pre-equilibrated 30
vol. % TBP in kerosene. The pre-equilibrated organic solution
was prepared by mixing the TBP+kerosene mixture with an equal
volume of 3M nitric acid.
7) The sample was then shaken for 1 minute and allowed to settle.
The organic phase was recovered with a disposable pipette and
transferred to a clean shaker.
8) An equal volume of 3M nitric acid was then added to the
organic solution. The mixture was then shaken for 1 minute and
allowed to settle before the organic solution was again recovered
and transferred to a clean shaker with a disposable pipette.
9) The organic solution was then mixed with an equal volume of
DI water and shaken for 1 minute. After settling, the organic
phase was removed, leaving only the aqueous solution. The
aqueous phase was then acidified to approximately 3M HNO3 by
the addition of concentrated nitric acid. This sample was then
filtered and diluted for ICP analysis.
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3.3.4 Thorium Extraction and Decontamination Data
Using the CA (V2) procedure, thorium was extracted and purified from
borosilicate glass to determine the thorium extraction efficiency, the thorium
recovery efficiency, the contamination factors, and the decontamination
factors for the CA (V2) process. Glass from 2 batches (T1P1 and T1P2) was used,
and 5 samples were prepared using each glass. The extraction and
decontamination of the thorium from the borosilicate glass host form was
performed in two stages: the extraction stage (I) and the decontamination
stage (II). The average contamination factors for the product solution of the
extraction process (stage I) along with the 97.7% confidence interval (2
standard deviation) are shown in table 3.4 for both the T1P1 and T1P2 glass.
While the average contamination factors of most elements are not
within 2 standard deviations between the two glasses the extraction
efficiencies are. This can most likely be attributed to some inhomogeneity in
the ARM-1 frit or some slight variations in the glass composition (due to
laboratory error, etc...). Comparing the contamination factors in the
extraction solution with the nominal contamination factors in the glass (Table
3.5), shows that, for the most part, most elements are easier to extract from the
glass matrix than the thorium (shown by decontamination factors less than
1.0). The one exception to this is silicon itself, which is extracted into solution
almost 100 times less than thorium.
The average contamination factors for the product solution of the
decontamination process (stage II) along with the 97.7% confidence interval
(2 standard deviation) spread are shown in table 3.6 for both the T1P1 and T1P2
glass.
Unlike the extraction part of the CA (V2) process, the spread associated
with the observed contamination factors for the decontamination stage was
quite large. The difference between the two glasses was not as evident as the
disparity between individual runs from a given batch which suggests that the
large spread in the data is due to the decontamination process itself. Given the
crudeness of the process, this is not unexpected. Using the average values of
the contamination factors from the decontamination process (table 3.6) and
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the extraction process (table 3.4), the decontamination factors for the solvent
extraction decontamination process can be determined. From the extraction
efficiency and the recovery efficiency, the process efficiency can be
determined.
The analysis of the decontamination stage of the CA process (stage II)
assumes a Gaussian distribution for the data. However, the data (Appendix B,
section [B.5.2]) may be better described by some other distribution.
Nevertheless, it may be more informative to look at the mean values for
the decontamination process along with the highest and lowest
decontamination factors. This will provide not only an average performance
level for the second stage of the CA process, but will also provide both an
optimistic and pessimistic limit for the decontamination factors for the
process. As the composition of the extraction solution obtained from the glass
samples used was quite similar (especially when compared to the relative error
associated with the stage II contamination and decontamination factors), the
data from the 2 samples was combined for this analysis.
From these values, an average value for the Stage II decontamination
factor (DF) can be determined. From the average extraction and recovery
efficiencies, the process efficiency can be determined with equation 3.3a.
Process Efficiency (Pth) = 26.72 %
47
Table 3.4: CA Process - Stage I Contamination Factors
Table 3.4: This table contains the average contamination factors for the
product solution of the extraction process (stage I). The absolute error values
listed are the 97.7% confidence interval spread of the experimental data. Also
included are the extraction efficiencies (eth) for the 2 batches.
TiPi Batch
CF error
0.627 0.023
1.060 0.040
0.997 0.024
1.140 0.033
2.330 0.181
0.130 0.044
4.063 0.380
2.012 0.089
90.71% 6.00%
T1P2 Batch
CF error
0.681 0.008
1.050 0.031
1.048 0.015
1.147 0.013
2.736 0.060
0.154 0.029
4.208 0.333
2.254 0.013
86.16% 3.14%
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element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Si
Na
B
eth
Table 3.5; CA Process - Stage I Decontamination Factors
Table 3.5: This table shows a comparison of the average contamination factors
in the product solution from the extraction process (stage I) and the
contamination factors in the borosilicate glass host form (from Appendix Al).
The decontamination factors obtained by the extraction process were
determined from the ratio of the contamination factor of a given element in
the host glass to the contamination factor of that element in the extracted
solution.
TIPI Batch
CF DF
0.627 1.024
1.060 0.927
0.997 0.992
1.140 0.857
2.330 1.146
0.130 87.31
4.063 0.923
2.012 0.912
T1P2 Batch
CF DF
0.681 0.943
1.050 0.936
1.048 0.944
1.147 0.852
2.736 0.976
0.154 73.70
4.208 0.891
2.254 0.814
49
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Si
Na
B
Glass
CF
0.642
0.983
0.989
0.977
2.67
11.35
3.75
1.835
Table 3.6: CA Process - Stage II Contamination Factors
Table 3.6: This table contains the average contamination factors for the
product solution of the decontamination process (stage II). The absolute error
values listed are the 97.7% confidence interval spread of the experimental
data. Also included are the recovery efficiencies (rth) for the 2 batches.
T1P1 Batch
_C_ error
0.021 0.012
0.066 0.057
0.057 0.046
0.067 0.052
0.085 0.084
0.020 0.031
0.047 0.036
0.027 0.037
30.35% 7.53%
T1P2 Batch
CF error
0.026 0.030
0.079 0.072
0.071 0.063
0.081 0.076
0.123 0.138
0.005 0.010
0.055 0.112
0.049 0.084
30.06% 7.89%
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element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Si
Na
B
rth
Table 3.7: CA Process - Stage II Decontamination Factors
Table 3.7: This table contains the decontamination factors (DF) calculated for
the solvent extraction decontamination process (stage II) of the CA process.
The DF's were calculated from the average contamination factors of the final
product stream (table 3.6) and the initial feed stream (table 3.4) to the
decontamination process. The error shown below is the absolute error at the
97.7% confidence interval.
T1P1 Batch
DF error
29.9 17.1
16.1 13.9
17.5 14.1
17.0 13.2
27.4 27.2
6.5 10.3
86.4 66.7
74.5 102.2
T1P2 Batch
DF error
26.2 30.2
13.3 12.1
14.8 13.1
14.2 13.3
22.2 25.0
30.8 61.9
76.5 155.9
46.0 78.9
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Si
Na
B
Table 3.8; Average Contamination Factors for the CA Process
Table 3.8: This table contains the average contamination factors for the
product solutions from the first and second stages of the CA process. Stage I is
the product of the extraction process. Stage II represents the product solution
from the decontamination process. Also included are the average extraction
and recovery efficiencies, respectively.
Stage I CF's
0.654
1.055
1.023
1.144
2.533
0.142
4.136
2.133
eth = 88.44 %
Stage II CF's
0.024
0.073
0.064
0.074
0.104
0.013
0.051
0.038
rth = 30.21 %
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element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Si
Na
B
Table 3.9: Average Decontamination Factors for the CA Process
Table 3.9: This table contains the average decontamination factors (DF) for the
product solution from the second stage of the CA process. These DF's were
determined from the average contamination factors for the feed and product
solutions to the decontamination process (stage II). Also provided are the
highest and lowest decontamination factors observed during the experimental
work.
element Average DF High Low
Ce 27.25 55.19 13.83
Eu 14.45 35.24 8.90
Gd 15.98 35.10 9.59
Sm 15.46 34.20 9.30
Nd 24.36 68.09 12.60
Si 10.92 1498.2 11.54
Na 81.10 1608.5 24.53
B 56.13 568.0 19.04
3.4 Observations and Discussion of Experimental Work
Over the course of the experimental work performed as part of this
project a number of problems were encountered. This section will discuss the
problems encountered, as well as detailing the observations and decisions
(such as which processes to pursue to extract the thorium, for example) made
during this project.
3,4.1 Development of Crushed Glass- Acid Dissolution Process (CA process)
The Crushed Glass-Acid dissolution (CA) process that was used in this
work to extract and purify the thorium from the borosilicate glass was
developed in two separate stages: the extraction stage and the decontamination
stage. The decision-making processes involved in developing this process are
detailed below.
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3.4.1.1 Choice of Extraction Technique
The initial extraction experiments examined the effectiveness of the two
techniques suggested by the background research: acid dissolution and alkali
fusion. The first extraction scoping experiments were performed on 'large'
(on the order of 1 cm 3 in volume) pieces of borosilicate glass (see appendix B,
section [B.1]), without much success in extracting the thorium into solution.
The subsequent experiments using crushed glass however, were much more
successful.
In order to compare the two extraction techniques, the extraction
experiments using crushed glass were repeated and analyzed for not only the
extraction of thorium but also the relative concentrations of various spoiler
elements [B.2]. The two acid extraction experiments showed extraction
efficiencies greater than 80% for thorium. The alkali fusion (combining all of
the extraction streams) had an extraction efficiency of around 40%. The alkali
fusion technique did, however, reduce the relative levels of contaminants in
the product (thorium-bearing) solution (tables B.2 and B.4 show contamination
factors that are less than 1.0 for all three added rare earths, indicating a
relative reduction in their concentrations).
In the end, however, the acid dissolution technique was chosen over the
alkali fusion technique for two reasons: simplicity and extraction efficiency.
The alkali fusion technique, at least at the bench top scale, had a great number
of unresolved parameters associated with using a lab top burner to heat the
fusion (eventually, the laboratory furnace would be necessary to do any
larger (more than 0.5 grams of glass) extraction experiments). Also, after the
fusion was created, it was necessary to dissolve the salts out of the crucible
(without losing any material, etc...). In comparison, the acid dissolution
technique required only that the samples be stirred every 30 minutes and that
the laboratory ovens be monitored to control the oven temperature. While not
a factor at the time, the choice of the acid dissolution method simplified the use
of a solvent extraction process for the decontamination stage (as the product of
the acid dissolution process is a nitric acid solution).
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3.4.1.2 Choice of Decontamination Technique
After the acid dissolution technique was chosen to be the extraction
technique, it was used to create a large volume of extracted solution to
facilitate some scoping experiments on decontamination experiments. The
first techniques examined were precipitation techniques based on the original
decontamination experiments done to purify plutonium for the Manhattan
Project [2.5]. As thorium was used as the plutonium surrogate, it was not
possible to examine the effectiveness of the reduction-oxidation techniques
normally used to purify plutonium. Of the precipitation techniques examined
[B.3.1], none provided any significant decontamination factors for the rare
earth elements. However, the hydroxide and phosphate precipitation
techniques did seem to be able to remove some of the glass formers (silicon
boron, and sodium). Hydroxide precipitation (table B.7) reduced the relative
concentration of sodium by a factor of 50 and reduced the relative
concentration of boron by a factor of 4. The phosphate precipitation process
(table B.9) and a decontamination factor of greater than 10 for silicon, sodium,
and boron. While these processes were not chosen for the decontamination
stage of the CA process, they could possibly be used as head--end strike
processes to remove the glass-former elements if desired.
As the precipitation processes were unable to sufficiently remove the
added rare earths (europium, samarium, and gadolinium), it was necessary to
examine other techniques. The most obvious choice was to examine solvent
extraction as a possible decontamination technique. After examining the
effects of an acid wash stage, solvent recycle, and multiple stage cycles, the
1+1 decontamination process (1 solvent extraction cycle with 1 acid wash cycle
[B.4.2]) was chosen as the best trade off between high decontamination factors
and high recovery efficiency for thorium.
3,4,2 Acid Concentration and Extraction Efficiency
Initially, the acid extraction stage of the CA process was done with a 5
vol. % nitric acid solution (see CA version 1, appendix B.2.6.1), which was the
acid concentration used in the scoping experiments. The initial extraction
experiments, using the 5 vol. % acid solution, had an extraction efficiency of
around 80 % (which is why this method was chosen to extract the thorium
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from the glass). However, when experiments were performed to confirm the
effectiveness of the CA procedure (CA V1, acid extraction with 5 vol. % nitric
acid), the extraction efficiency was observed to be only 30 - 40 % [B.2.6.2]. The
original experiments were re-analyzed to determine if some error had been
made, but none was found. Thus, for some reason, the extraction efficiency of
the acid dissolution process appears to alternate between 40 % and 80 %,,
without spanning the intermediate values.
In order to determine why the extraction efficiency would sometimes be
over 80% and sometimes be only 40%, a number of other factors were
examined. The factors examined were oven temperature, acid concentration,
and particle size. For all of these experiments, the same procedure was used
(except for the variable of interest) for extracting the thorium from the glass.
Also, all of these experiments were performed using glass from the T1P1 batch
to avoid any differences in glass composition between experiments.
The acid concentration examined were 5 vol. %, 10 vol. %, and 25 vol. %
[B.2.7.1]. For all three acid concentrations, the observed thorium extraction
efficiency was over 80% (between 83 % and 84%).
Oven temperatures examined were 80'C, 90'C, and 100'C. Two
experiments, one at 80 0C and the other at 100°C, were done the same day. The
90°C run from the acid concentration experiment was used for the baseline
condition. Both the 80'C and 100°C experiments were observed to have
extraction efficiencies greater than 90% (which may mean that the
temperature selected for the CA process is not the optimal temperature), which
suggested that the slight variations (+/- 5°C) that were normally observed
during the extraction experiments were not likely responsible for the change
in the extraction efficiency.
Finally particle size was examined [B.2.7.3]. The crushed glass was sorted
by particle size (using a set of mesh screens). For the particles that did not
pass through a 25 mesh screen, the extraction efficiency in 5 vol. % nitric acid
was observed to be only 28%, while for particles that did pass through a 25
mesh screen the extraction efficiency was over 40%. For particles smaller
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than the 60 mesh screen openings, but that did not pass through a 120 mesh
screen the extraction efficiency was observed to be almost 60%. As a result of
this experiment, it was decided to standardize the CA procedure somewhat by
requiring that the crushed glass all pass through a 60 mesh screen. However,
the effects of particle size alone still did not explain the observation that the
extraction efficiency would sometimes be around 40% and sometimes be
around 80%.
No reason for the apparently bi-modal extraction efficiency of the acid
dissolution procedure has been determined. However, it is possible that this
event may be due to variations in the acid concentration of the 5 vol. % nitric
acid solution (perhaps the 5 vol. % is near the shoulder of a very steep
extraction curve or is near to some threshold value). In any event, it was
decided to increase the acid concentration to 25 vol. % (3.9 M HNO3) to avoid
this phenomenon. Further experiments using the more concentrated acid
solution have not shown a similar phenomenon.
3.4,3 Determination of Cesium by ICP analysis
In analyzing the experimental data it was discovered that there was a
problem with the cesium measurements. According to the cesium
concentrations measured by the ICP, over 200% of the cesium present in the
glass was extracted into solution. After observing this discrepancy, it was
discovered that there was a spectral interference at the wavelength used to
determine the cesium concentration (455.5 nm) due to cerium. As there were
no other lines available for the determination of cesium concentration,
another technique had to be investigated.
While there are no interference-free lines available to determine the
concentration of cesium, there are interference-free lines available for
cerium. Thus, it was proposed to measure the apparent cesium concentration
due to cerium and determine a correlation between cerium concentration and
apparent cesium concentration (a technique originally used to resolve
spectral interferences in Neutron Activation Analysis). By subtracting the
apparent cesium concentration (due to the cerium interference) from the
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observed cesium concentration, it theoretically would be possible to determine
the actually cesium concentration in a given sample.
In attempting to calibrate the ICP to determine the cesium
concentration it was discovered that without the added activity associated with
the presence of cerium, there was not sufficient activity at the 455 nm
wavelength to detect the peak above the background. This suggests that the
actual detection limit for cesium is above 10 ppm (the highest concentration
limit used in the calibration attempt). In order to determine the cesium
concentrations in the sample, it would be necessary to use a more concentrated
sample. However, the more concentrated samples from the CA process were
not archived as they contained some amounts of the organic solution used in
the decontamination process which was observed to react with the sample
storage containers. Also, samples with significant organic concentrations can
not be run through the ICP as they might damage some of the components of
the system.
3.5 Summary of Experimental Work
Thorium can be recovered from a borosilicate glass matrix by using the
CA process, which involves crushing the glass, dissolving the glass in nitric
acid, and removing the contaminants via a solvent extraction process. The
extraction step of the bench top process was able to extract 88.4 ± 6.8 % of the
thorium from the glass in the initial extraction (the glass could possibly be
recycled to extract the remaining thorium). The bench top solvent extraction
process was able to reduce the levels of contaminants in the thorium to the
levels seen in table 3.9, and was 30.2 ± 10.9 % efficient in recovering the
thorium in the product stream (the recovery efficiency could be increased by
recovering the thorium from the waste streams of the decontamination
process). Overall, the CA process efficiency was 26.7 ± 9.9 %.
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4. Analysis of Data
The primary focus of this work was to determine if (and how) a would-
be proliferator could recover weapons-usable material from a borosilicate
glass WGPu host form. The experimental work (described in the previous
chapter) shows that it is possible to extract and purify plutonium (actually,
thorium was used as a plutonium surrogate) from a borosilicate glass host form
that contains not only fission products (simulated), but also criticality control
elements (europium, samarium, and gadolinium; as proposed and examined by
Sylvester (S5)). In this chapter, the question of weapons-usability will be
addressed by determining the compressed critical mass of the recovered
plutonium compounds. From the compressed critical mass results and the
extraction and recovery efficiencies (determined in chapter 3 for the CA
process), it will also be possible to determine the quantity of WGPu-loaded (2
wt. %) borosilicate glass that would be required to recover enough plutonium
to construct one Trinity type device (3 critical masses).
4,1 Computational Techniques
The compressed critical mass of the reduced plutonium metal recovered
from the borosilicate glass host forms was determined for a number of cases
using the Monte Carlo Neutron Photon transport code to analyze a bare sphere
of metal. The compressed critical mass was examined (as opposed to the
uncompressed critical mass, for example) as it provides a "slightly more
realistic configuration" 1 for determining the amount of plutonium needed for
a weapon. Also, compressed critical mass was used for consistency in
comparing the results of this work with the initial analysis of this particular
borosilicate glass host form (S5) 2.
4,1,1 Monte Carlo Neutron Photon Transport Code
As the name of the code suggests, the Monte Carlo Neutron Photon
transport code (MCNP) uses Monte Carlo techniques to follow the transport of a
number of individual neutrons or photons through space. For each particle
1 Sylvester. A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposal. p 37 (S5)
2 Sylvester. A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposal. (S5)
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examined, statistical distributions are used to determine when, where, and how
the particle interacts with the specified material. After examining the
interactions of thousands of particles with the specified system, the results of
the particle 'runs' are averaged to determine the characteristics of the system.
A sample MCNP input deck is provided in appendix A3.
4.1.2 Computational Model3
Three principle assumptions were made for the purpose of determining
the compressed critical mass of the recovered plutonium: homogeneity, a bare
sphere geometry, and the use of fission products instead of neodymium and
cerium in the materials.
Barring any separation of phases during the reduction of the plutonium
solution to plutonium metal (4.2.1), the final metal should be fairly
homogenous. Thus the assumption of homogeneity should be fairly accurate.
The assumption of a bare sphere geometry, with the metal surrounded
by a vacuum, was made primarily to simplify the calculations (In an actual
device, the plutonium pit would most likely be surrounded by neutron
reflectors and explosives). However inaccurate this assumption may be, it
should provide results that are adequate enough for comparative purposes.
One further assumption was required for the compressed critical mass
calculations. The MCNP code does not have cross sections for either cerium or
neodymium. These elements were present in the ARM-1 frit to simulate the
behavior of fission products in the glass. For this calculation, it was assumed
that the combined levels of cerium and neodymium in the final product were
representative of the levels of fission products remaining in product. As such,
the cross sections provided by MCNP for the average fission products were
used.
3 paraphrased from Sylvester. A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium
Disposal. pp. 36- 37 (S5)
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To determine the critical mass of the recovered plutonium, an initial
estimate for the critical radius of the sphere and the density of the material
were provided to the MCNP code, which used the estimated values to determine
the keff (the effective neutron multiplication value) of the system. The
estimate of the critical radius was then adjusted until a keff value between
0.999 and 1.001 was reached (a neutron multiplication value of 1.0 implies that
the system is exactly critical, with one neutron produced for every neutron
absorbed). For the initial runs, a total of 40,000 particles were used to
determine the critical radius that results in a k value within 0.05 (or less) of
1.0. For the next set of runs, a total of 80,000 particles were used and the target
k value was within 0.01 to 0.005 of 1.0. Then the critical radius was found by
using 200,000 particles over 50 cycles.
The density of the compressed plutonium metal was estimated to be
twice that of uncompressed alpha-phase plutonium metal. Alpha-phase
plutonium metal has a density of 19.5 g/cc4 . The implicit assumption that the
density of the recovered plutonium metal is relatively unchanged by the
presence of the contaminant elements should not present a problem,
especially when compared with the assumption that the fissile material in the
device is compressed by exactly a factor of 2. If the final plutonium alloy has a
density significantly less than alpha phase plutonium metal, it was assumed
that the compression was sufficient so that the compressed plutonium alloy
has a density of 39.0 g/cm3 . This value was used for the compressed density for
all critical mass calculations for internal consistency.
4.2 Production of Plutonium Metal
The extraction and decontamination processes examined and detailed as
part of the CA process yield a final product that contains plutonium ions in a
nitric acid solution. In order to build a device, a would-be proliferator would
most likely reduce the plutonium ions to metallic plutonium. Plutonium metal
is the most likely form as it will provide the smallest critical mass for a given
amount of plutonium (for example, the use of plutonium oxide, PuO2, would
4 DeVolpi, A. Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. p. 93. (Dl)
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increase the compressed critical mass from 2.7 to 7.1 kg) 5 . A number of
processes that could potentially be used to reduce the plutonium ions to
plutonium metal are detailed in section 2.6 of this work.
The reduction of the thorium (the plutonium analog) and fabrication of
thorium metal were not attempted experimentally in this work. While the
processes do not appear to be incredibly complex or difficult, the safe
reduction of thorium (and plutonium) does require special equipment, which
was not available.
As the reduction was not carried out experimentally, the following
assumptions were made in order to determine the composition of the
plutonium metal that would be recovered using the CA process:
1) The reduction process does not result in the loss of plutonium.
Thus, it does not reduce the process efficiency;
2) The reduction process does not provide any additional removal
of contaminants from the plutonium. No additional
decontamination is provided by the reduction processes.
The first assumption that no material is lost is not a bad assumption, as it
should be possible for a would-be proliferator to recover almost all material
'lost' from the reduction process (it may not be economical, but it is possible).
The second assumption is fairly conservative, as the various processes
involved in the reduction of plutonium metal have been demonstrated to
provide some additional decontamination. However, as decontamination factors
were not available for all of the elements involved for all of the processes that
could potentially be used in the reduction process, it was simpler to just assume
that no additional decontamination was provided by the reduction process. As
a result of this assumption, the plutonium compounds analyzed will be more
contaminated and will most likely have a larger critical mass than plutonium
5Sylvester. A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposal. p. 39 (S5)
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compounds actually recovered by the CA process and reduced to plutonium
metal.
4.3 Cases Examined
Five separate plutonium compositions were examined to determine the
compressed critical mass of the plutonium recovered from a borosilicate glass
host form (with added spoiler elements). The first three examined
compositions were determined from the experimental performance of the CA
process in this work (after a theoretical reduction of the nitric acid solution to
metal). In order to bound the performance of the CA process, the compressed
critical mass was determined not only for the average CA process product
composition, but also for the 'best' and 'worst' product compositions obtained
(where best and worst refer to the plutonium weight fraction in the reduced
metal; the 'best' composition had the highest plutonium weight fraction and
the 'worst' composition had the lowest). The other two cases examined assumed
that a theoretical one-cycle PUREX process [2.5.3] was used to decontaminate
the product of an average acid dissolution extraction process (the first stage of
the CA process).
4.3.1 Baseline Case
The baseline case for this work used the composition of the average
product solution generated by the crushed glass in acid dissolution process
(the CA process). The composition of the recovered plutonium metal (if we
substitute plutonium for thorium) is given in table 4.1.
Using the isotopics listed for weapons-grade plutonium in table 2.3, the
radius of a critical bare sphere was determined using MCNP to be 3.18 cm,
which corresponds to a compressed critical mass of 4.72 kg of alloy. If we
assume that the borosilicate glass is loaded at 2 wt. % plutonium oxide and if we
use the average process efficiency (Pth = 26.72 %), then a would-be
proliferator would need to obtain 2087.4 kg of glass (14.16 kg of plutonium
alloy) in order to recover enough fissile material for a Trinity type device.
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Table 4.1: Baseline Plutonium Alloy Composition
Table 4.1: This table contains the average composition of the plutonium
recovered using the CA process. The mass fraction of the individual
contaminants are given below as a percentage of the total mass.
Element Mass Fraction (%)
Plutonium (Pu) 69.4 %
Europium (Eu) 5.1 %
Gadolinium (Gd) 4.4 %
Samarium (Sm) 5.1 %
Fission Products (avg. FP) 8.9 %
Silicon (Si) 0.9 %
Sodium (Na) 3.5 %
Boron (B) 2.6%
4.3.2 Best CA Product case
In this case, the composition of the plutonium metal was taken to be that
of the product solution of the CA run that had the highest weight percentage
of plutonium (experiment LB [B.5.2]). This case was chosen as it provides an
upper bound on the effectiveness of the CA process (as it was done in this
experiment), and thus could be considered the best a would-be proliferator
could achieve without using more advance technology and equipment. The
plutonium metal composition used for this case is given in table 4.2.
The compressed critical mass of this alloy, determined by MCNP, is 3.295
kg, which corresponds to a bare sphere of radius 2.82 cm. The process
efficiency for the LB experiment (the 'best' CA product) can be determined
from the extraction efficiency (eth = 88.9 %) and the recovery efficiency (rth
= 28.5 %) using equation 3.3a to be 25.3 %. Given this process efficiency, a
would-be proliferator would require 1870.8 kg of borosilicate glass (at 2 wt. %
PuO2) for a Trinity type device, without having to recover plutonium from the
waste streams of the CA process. If the average CA process efficiency (Pth =
26.7 %) were used in this calculation, the amount of glass needed drops to
1797.0 kg of glass.
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Table 4.2: CA Process- 'Best' Plutonium Alloy Composition
Table 4.2: This table contains the best composition of the plutonium recovered
using the CA process (the least contaminated). The mass fraction of the
individual contaminants are given below as a percentage of the total mass.
Element Mass Fraction (%)
Plutonium (Pu) 85.47 %
Europium (Eu) 2.65 %
Gadolinium (Gd) 2.48%
Samarium (Sm) 2.91%
Fission Products (avg. FP) 3.90%
Silicon (Si) 0.77 %
Sodium (Na) 1.45 %
Boron (B) 0.34 %
4.3.3 Worst CA Product case
In this case, the composition of the plutonium metal was taken to be that
of the product solution of the CA run that had the lowest weight percentage of
plutonium (experiment 02 [B.5.2]). This case was chosen as it provides a lower
bound on the effectiveness of the CA process (as it was done in this
experiment), and thus could be considered the best that the waste form could
perform in regards to deterring or complicating the recovery of the WGPu
from the glass.
The compressed critical mass of this alloy was determined to be 8.237 kg
using MCNP, based on a critical radius for the bare sphere of 3.83 cm. The
process efficiency for the 02 experiment (the 'worst' CA product) can be
determined from the extraction efficiency (eth = 86.9 %) and the recovery
efficiency (rth = 23.8 %) using equation 3.3a to be 20.7 %. Given this process
efficiency, a would-be proliferator would require 3618.0 kg of borosilicate
glass (at 2 wt. % PuO2) to recover the three compressed critical masses needed
for a Trinity type device, without recovering plutonium from the waste
streams of the CA process. If the average CA process efficiency (Pth = 26.7 %)
were used in this calculation, the amount of glass needed would be 2802.6 kg.
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Table 4.3; CA Process- 'Worst' Plutonium Alloy Composition
Table 4.3: This table contains the worst composition of the plutonium
recovered using the CA process (the most contaminated). The mass fraction of
the individual contaminants are given below as a percentage of the total mass.
Element Mass Fraction (%)
Plutonium (Pu) 53.28 %
Europium (Eu) 6.18%
Gadolinium (Gd) 5.81 %
Samarium (Sm) 6.39 %
Fission Products (avg. FP) 14.12%
Silicon (Si) 0.69 %
Sodium (Na) 7.19 %
Boron (B) 6.34%
4,3,4 Ideal PUREX Decontamination
The CA process used to recover the plutonium from the borosilicate glass
uses a very crude solvent decontamination process. While this may be
representative of the technology available to a sub-national or terrorist
group, nation state and weapons states interested in recovering the plutonium
would most likely have access to more modern decontamination techniques
and equipment, such as a PUREX plant. This case examined the use of a PUREX
facility to decontaminate the plutonium solutions extracted from the glass. In
this case, a decontamination factor of 104 was used for all contaminants 6 . It
was assumed that the concentration of contaminants in the feed solution for
the PUREX process was the average contaminant concentrations from the first
stage of the CA process (table 3.8). For this case it was also assumed that head-
end and/or tail-end strike processes were used to provide sufficient
decontamination from silicon, sodium, and boron, which are not typically
6A value of 2*104 is given as the decontamination factor for the first stage of a
commercial PUREX facility in Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The Chemistry
of the Actinide Elements. p. 534 (K2)
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present in spent fuel elements and which may be problematic to the PUREX
process.
The compressed critical mass calculated for this alloy composition is
2.425 kg with a critical radius of 2.55 cm for the bare sphere (again using
MCNP). If we assume that the extraction process was as efficient as the
average CA process was in the lab (avg. eth = 86.2 %) and that the PUREX type
solvent extraction process is 95 % efficient (which is probably on the low side)
in recovering plutonium, then it would be possible to recover enough material
from 504.0 kg of borosilicate glass (loaded to 2 wt. % plutonium oxide) to create
a device similar in design to the Trinity device.
Table 4.4: Plutonium Alloy Composition for Ideal PUREX case
Table 4.4: This table contains the composition of the plutonium metal resulting
from an ideal PUREX decontamination process. The mass fraction of the
individual contaminants are given below as a percentage of the total mass.
Element Mass Fraction (%)
Plutonium (Pu) 99.87 %
Europium (Eu) 0.0105 %
Gadolinium (Gd) 0.0102 %
Samarium (Sm) 0.0114%
Fission Products (avg. FP) 0.032 %
Silicon (Si) 0.0014 %
Sodium (Na) 0.0413%
Boron (B) 0.0213%
4,3,5 Non-Ideal PUREX Decontamination
As mentioned in the previous case, the PUREX process was not designed
to remove the glass-forming elements (silicon, sodium, and boron), which are
not normally present in appreciable quantities in spent fuel. The PUREX
process, which is basically a multi-stage solvent extraction process, should be
able to achieve at least the same decontamination factor for these elements as
the simple solvent extraction process used as part of the CA process. For this
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case, a decontamination factor of 104 was used for the rare earth elements
(typical of the first stage of a commercial PUREX plant7 ) and the average
decontamination factors from the CA process (table 3.9) were used for silicon
(DF = 10.92), sodium (DF = 81.10), and boron (DF = 56.13). The composition of the
plutonium metal after a non-ideal PUREX process and a theoretical reduction
process is given in table 4.5.
The compressed critical mass calculated the non-ideal PUREX
decontamination case is 2.460 kg (the critical radius was determined by MCNP
to be 2.56 cm). If we assume that the extraction process was as efficient as the
average CA process was in the lab (avg. eth = 86.2 %) and that the PUREX type
solvent extraction process is 95 % efficient (which is probably on the low side)
in recovering plutonium, then it would be possible to recover three
compressed critical mass (enough for a Trinity type device) from 464.4 kg of
borosilicate glass (loaded to 2 wt. % plutonium oxide). Note that this value is
lower than for the ideal PUREX decontamination case, even though the
concentration of non-fissile elements is higher. This can most likely be
attributed to the process by which the critical radii were determined, as the
radii were selected when keff was within 0.001 of 1.0 (which is not an
incredibly small difference for neutron multiplication values), as well as the
statistical spread associated with the keff values determined using MCNP
(which was typically on the order of 0.002 or less for the final keff
determinations).
7 A value of 2*104 is given as the decontamination factor for the first stage of a
commercial PUREX facility in Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The Chemistry of the
Actinide Elements. p. 534 (K2)
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Table 4.5: Plutonium Alloy Composition for Non-Ideal PUREX case
Table 4.5: This table contains the composition of the plutonium metal resulting
from a non-ideal PUREX decontamination process. The mass fraction of the
individual contaminants are given below as a percentage of the total mass.
Element Mass Fraction (%)
Plutonium (Pu) 90.695 %
Europium (Eu) 0.0095 %
Gadolinium (Gd) 0.0092 %
Samarium (Sm) 0.0103 %
Fission Products (avg. FP) 0.0235 %
Silicon (Si) 1.179 %
Sodium (Na) 4.625 %
Boron (B) 3.446 %
4.4 Summary of Analytical Work
Using the bare sphere computational model describe above, the
compressed critical masses were determined for a number of scenarios. The
first three scenarios show the effectiveness of the CA process in recovering a
usable plutonium alloy from the borosilicate glass host form. For the CA
process, the average, best, and worst product compositions were examined to
determine the potential range of performance for the process. Additionally,
two cases were examined in which the bench top solvent extraction process
was replaced with a plant-scale PUREX decontamination process. In the first
PUREX case, it was assumed that all contaminants were reduced by a factor of
104 (typical for a 1 stage PUREX process). In the second, non-ideal case, it was
assumed that all elements except for the primary glass constituents (sodium,
silicon, and boron) were removed with a decontamination factor of 104, while
the glass constituents were removed with the same decontamination factor
that was observed in the bench top experiments.
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From these critical masses and the average process efficiencies for the
CA process (with a recovery efficiency of 95% assumed for the 2 PUREX cases),
the amount of 2 wt. % WGPu glass needed to extract enough fissile material to
build a device similar to the Trinity device (3 critical masses).
If the WGPu is disposed of in 2000 kg glass logs (at 2 wt %
plutonium oxide), a would-be proliferator using the CA process would most
likely have to either steal two logs or use some kind of recovery process to
recover the plutonium from the waste streams of the CA process in order to
recovery enough material for a Trinity type nuclear device. However, a
would-be proliferator using the acid extraction and a PUREX-type
decontamination process (or a decontamination process with a similar
recovery efficiency), could recover more than enough material from 1 log for
3 Trinity type devices.
Table 4.6: Compressed Critical Mass Calculation Results
Table 4.6: This table contains the compressed critical mass (CCM) results
determined for the 5 listed cases using MCNP. The amount of WGPu-bearing
borosilicate glass (2 wt. % loading) required to recover 3 CCM (1 Trinity mass)
is also provided.
Case Examined CCM Glass Required
Average 4.72 kg 2087.4 kg
Best Case 3.295 kg 1797.0 kg
Worst Case 8.237 kg 3618.0 kg
Ideal PUREX 2.425 kg 504.0 kg
Non-Ideal PUREX 2.460 kg 464.4 kg
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5. Summary and Conclusions
5.1 Summary of Experimental Work
The primary focus of this work was to examine the question of
retrieving weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) from a borosilicate glass host
form in order to determine what, if any, resistance to proliferation could be
gained by vitrifying the WGPu. The host form studied in this work was a
borosilicate glass matrix with added simulated fission products (the ARM-1 or
Advanced Reference Material) 1. The glass frit was further modified by the
inclusion of thorium, europium, gadolinium, and samarium. The thorium was
added as a surrogate for plutonium, and constituted 2 wt. % of the final glass
composition. The rare earths (Eu, Gd, and Sm) were added for long-term
criticality control and to possibly increase the proliferation resistance of the
host form2.
After examining a number of potential extraction and decontamination
processes, the Crushed glass - Acid dissolution process (CA process) was
developed to recover the plutonium from the glass. In brief, the CA process
uses a 25 vol. % nitric acid solution (3.8M) to leach the plutonium and other
elements from the pulverized glass matrix (particle size > 250 microns). The
fission products, criticality control elements, and remaining glass formers are
separated from the plutonium using a simple solvent extraction process.
Once the CA process had been developed, it was tested experimentally to
determine its effectiveness. On average, the extraction stage of the process
was able to remove 88.44 ± 6.77 % of the plutonium surrogate from the glass.
The average concentration of the contaminants, relative to the plutonium
surrogate concentration in solution, and the associate 97.7 % confidence limits
(2 standard deviation error) are shown below in table 5.1.
The extracted solution was then decontaminated with a solvent
extraction process. In the laboratory, the recovery efficiency of this stage of
1Sylvester, K. A Strategy for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposition. p. 47 (S5)
2 ibid. pp. 62-71 (S5)
the process was 30.21 ± 10.91 %, meaning that around 30 % of the plutonium
surrogate in the feed solution (from the extraction stage) was recovered in the
product solution. From the recovery efficiency and the extraction efficiency,
the overall process efficiency for the CA process was determined to be 26.7 ±
9.9 % (by equation 3.3a). The average decontamination factors observed for
the solvent extraction process are listed in table 5.2, along with the best and
worst observed decontamination factors.
Finally, MCNP was used to determine the compressed critical mass of the
plutonium recovered from the borosilicate glass to see how the vitrification
would affect the suitability of the plutonium for building a weapon. Once the
compressed critical mass was determined, it was possible to determine how
much glass a would-be proliferator would need to be able to recover one
compressed critical mass (CCM) of plutonium. To determine this value, it was
assumed that the WGPu-loading in the borosilicate glass was 2 wt. % plutonium
oxide. Using the average process efficiency, the amount of glass required to
recover enough plutonium to build a device similar to the Trinity device was
determined for the average product composition of the CA process, as well as
for the 'best' and 'worst' case compositions, with the assumption that the
proliferator does not recover any plutonium from the waste streams. These
results are shown below in table 5.3
To account for the crude nature of the solvent extraction cycle, it was
assumed that a one stage plant-scale PUREX was used for the decontamination
process in two additional cases. In the first case, it was assumed that a
decontamination factor (DF) of 104 was obtained for all contaminants 3 . In the
second case, it was assumed that the 104 decontamination factor was for all of
the fission products and rare earths. The average decontamination factors for
the solvent extraction done in the lab were used for the decontamination
factors for this non-ideal PUREX process for silicon, sodium, and boron. This
second case was examined because the PUREX process was not designed to
3 Katz, et. al., list a decontamination factor of 2*104 for the first stage of a
commercial PUREX plant. Katz, Seaborg, and Morss. The Chemistry of
the Actinide Elements. p. 534. (K2)
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handle these elements and there has been some concern that these elements
may pose problematic for the PUREX process. The observed DF's were used for
sodium, silicon, and boron because it was assumed that any large scale process
should be able to at least meet the same decontamination that was obtained in
the lab. A recovery efficiency of 95% for plutonium was assumed for the
plant-scale PUREX process to account for the use of solvent recycle and other
recovery techniques. The critical mass and glass requirements for recovering
the material to build one Trinity type device are given in table 5.4 for these
cases.
The glass required to recover enough material for a Trinity type device
from borosilicate glass using a non-ideal PUREX process was determined to be
less than the amount required with an ideal process, even though the ideal
process would result in significantly less contamination of the plutonium
alloy. One possible explanation of this could be that the critical radii
determine through MCNP for the two cases were very close to each other. The
method for determining the critical radius of the cases did have some
associated standard deviation (due to the statistical nature of the process),
which would be magnified by this calculation (the critical mass is determined
from the volume of the sphere, which is proportional to the cube of the
radius).
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Table 5.1: Average Contaminant CF's for Extraction Process
Table 5.1: This table contains the average contamination factors (CF's) for the
extraction stage of the CA process. Along with the average CF is the absolute
error associated with the 97.7 % confidence interval (2 standard deviation).
element CF error
Ce 0.654 0.024
Eu 1.055 0.051
Gd 1.023 0.028
Sm 1.144 0.035
Nd 2.533 0.191
Si 0.142 0.053
Na 4.136 0.505
B 2.133 0.090
Table 5.2: Average Decontamination Factors for the CA Process
Table 5.2: This table contains the average decontamination factors (DF) for the
product solution from the second stage of the CA process, along with the
highest and lowest observed DF's. (note: this table is also given as table 3.9)
element Average DF High LOW
Ce 27.25 55.19 13.83
Eu 14.45 35.24 8.90
Gd 15.98 35.10 9.59
Sm 15.46 34.20 9.30
Nd 24.36 68.09 12.60
Si 10.92 1498.2 11.54
Na 81.10 1608.5 24.53
B 56.13 568.0 19.04
Table 5.3; Compressed Critical Mass Results for the CA Process
Table 5.3: This table contains the compressed critical masses (CCM) for the
average product of the CA process, as well as for the best and worst case
scenarios. Also included is the amount of glass that a would be proliferator
would require to recover enough material for one Trinity type device (three
compressed critical masses) without waste recycle.
Case Examined CCM Glass Required
Average 4.72 kg 2087.4 kg
Best Case 3.295 kg 1797.0 kg
Worst Case 8.237 kg 3618.0 kg
Table 5,4: Compressed Critical Mass Results for the PUREX Cases
Table 5.4: This table contains the compressed critical masses (CCM) for the two
PUREX decontamination cases, described above. The glass required entry
indicates the amount of borosilicate glass that would be required to recover
enough material for 1 Trinity type device (3 CCM's).
Case Examined CCM Glass Required
Ideal PUREX Decontamination 2.425 kg 504.0 kg
Non-Ideal PUREX Decontamination 2.460 kg 464.4 kg
5.2 Conclusion
After a search of the open literature, it was possible to extract a
plutonium surrogate (thorium) from borosilicate glass using common
laboratory equipment and techniques. At the bench top scale, the extraction
required a mortar and pestle to crush the glass, a laboratory oven, and some
common chemicals and glassware (the chemicals were nitric acid, tributyl
phosphate, and kerosene). A pilot plant version of the process could be done
with a ball mill and some mixer-settlers. On average, this process recovered
enough of a plutonium surrogate (thorium) to build a Trinity-type device from
2087 kg of glass (loaded at 2 wt. % plutonium). With some work, the process
efficiency could be increased, which would reduce the amount of material
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required to recover enough WGPu for a Trinity-type device (for example, with
the best results for the CA process, only 1797 kg of glass would be needed). For
a more sophisticated proliferator, the amount of glass required to recover the
enough WGPu for a Trinity-type device would be much less (between 450 kg
and 500 kg of 2 wt. % WGPu glass)
Without a radiation barrier, the chemical processing required to extract
WGPu from borosilicate glass is not sufficient to prevent a would-be
proliferator from easily recovering the plutonium for use in a nuclear device.
The presence of a radiation barrier would significantly complicate the
process, as remote handling and operations would be required for most of the
process. The radiation barrier would be a factor in handling the glass logs, as
well as in the crushing, extraction, and decontamination stages. After the
decontamination stage, the radiation barrier (primarily cesium) should be
reduce enough to permit hands-on work for the reduction stages. Using the
CA process, the radiation barrier would be reduced by a factor of 80 or more
(using sodium as an analog for cesium, as cesium data could not be
determined). This would reduce the radiation barrier from a reference level
of 2000 rad/hr to 25 rad/hr. A more sophisticated proliferator could expect to
reduce the cesium levels by a factor of 104 (the PUREX process is designed to
remove fission products such as cesium), which would reduce the reference
radiation barrier to only 0.2 rad/hr.
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6. Observations and Future Work
In order to determine if a host form is an acceptable final form for the
final disposition of WGPu, it is necessary to consider whether or not the host
form meets the spent fuel standard proposed by the National Academy of
Sciences [2.2.1] . For the various vitrification/ceramification proposals, it is
also beneficial to examine how a given host form would compare to other
vitrification/ceramification options. These issues will be addressed in this
section, along with some possible means of increasing the proliferation
resistance provided by vitrifying WGPu in a borosilicate glass host form.
6.1 Spent Fuel Standard
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recommends that the United
States and Former Soviet Union states (FSU) dispose of the excess weapons-
grade plutonium (recovered from dismantling the nuclear weapons programs)
"in a form from which the plutonium would be as difficult to recover for
weapons use as the larger and growing quantity of plutonium in commercial
spent fuel" 1. This statement is the basis of the spent fuel standard for the
disposition of WGPu. It is important to note that this is the only definition of
the spent fuel standard (SFS). Neither the NAS nor the U.S. Office of Fissile
Materials (OFMD) defined any quantitative measures for determining if a
given option meets or exceeds the SFS.
6.2 Barriers to Proliferation
One way to examine the proliferation resistance provided by a given
WGPu disposition option is to examine the barriers to the recovery and re-use
of the WGPu the final host form presents to a would-be proliferator. Some
barriers to consider in determining if a host form meets the spent fuel
standard could include the following:
Physical; How much material would-be proliferator need to
recover enough WGPu to make a device?
Chemical: How difficult would it be for a would-be proliferator to
extract weapons-usable plutonium from the host form?
1NAS report. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. 1994.
p 2. (NI)
Isotopic: How much of the plutonium is 2 3 9 pu?
Radiation: Does the host form provide itself with a self-
protecting radiation field? Is remote handling required to
work with the material?
Institutional: How well guarded is the material? How easy would
it be for a would-be proliferator to steal the material?
Informational: How well know are the technology and processes
that will be needed to recover and re-use the WGPu in a
device?
If a host form provides the same barriers to the recovery of plutonium as
spent fuel, it would should meet the spent fuel standard. However, it may not
be necessary for a host form to provide all of the barriers to proliferation
listed above to meet the spent fuel standard. For example, vitrifying WGPu in
borosilicate glass with High Level Waste (HLW) is considered to meet the SFS by
the NAS, even though it does not alter the isotopics of the plutonium (and thus
provide an isotopic barrier to proliferation).
6.3 Recovery of Plutonium from Spent Fuel
In order to compare a host form with spent fuel, it is first necessary to
examine how a proliferator would recover plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.
The first step in the recovery of plutonium from spent fuel is to physically cut
the fuel. The fuel is then dissolved in nitric acid, leaving the cladding
relatively intact. The chemistry of the resulting solution is then adjusted in
preparation for the primary decontamination stage, which is accomplished by
contacting the feed solution (the nitric acid solution containing the plutonium
and the fission products) with a 30 vol. % solution of TBP in a paraffinic
hydrocarbon diluent (the PUREX process). The plutonium and uranium from
the dissolved fuel are preferentially taken up in the organic phase, which is
then physically separated from the aqueous phase. The plutonium in the
organic phase is then reduced to the trivalent state and separated from the
uranium. The solvent extraction decontamination processes is then repeated
to further purify the plutonium stream.2 The recovered plutonium can then
2PUREX process paraphrased from Benedict, et. al. Nuclear Chemical
Engineering. pp. 466-468. (B2)
78
be reduced to metallic plutonium via a number of well-known processes [2.6].
The plutonium recovered from spent nuclear fuel is not normally weapons-
grade plutonium (unless the reactor was run in such a way as to produce
WGPu), and typically has the isotopic composition given for RGPu in section
2.7 (table 2.3).
6.4 Recovery of Plutonium from Borosilicate Glass
The CA process developed as part of this work could easily be scaled up
for use in recovering plutonium from borosilicate glass at the plant scale
(unlike the laboratory scale experiments done here). The monolithic glass
logs would be mechanically cut into pieces suitable as the feed into a ball mill
(or other similar piece of equipment), which will crush the glass until it
passes a 60 mesh screen. The crushed glass would then be poured into a
reaction vessel, where it would be leached with a 25 vol. % nitric acid solution
(3.8M HNO3) at 900C for 2 hours. The solution could then be filtered to remove
the undissolved glass, which could conceivably be recycled to remove any
remaining plutonium. The leachate solution could then be used as the feed for
a PUREX-type solvent extraction process to purify the plutonium (as done in
the CA process). Any head-end strike processes that are determined to be
necessary to prepare the feed for the decontamination process can easily be
added to the process line before the decontamination stage.
6.5 Borosilicate Glass and the Spent Fuel Standard
The recovery of WGPu from borosilicate glass uses almost exactly the
same procedure as the PUREX process for recovering plutonium from spent
fuel. The primary exception is that instead of decladding the fuel and
dissolving the mixed oxide fuel pellets, a would-be proliferator would have to
crushed the glass and dissolve out the plutonium oxide with nitric acid. Once
the plutonium is in solution, the same equipment could be used to
decontaminate and recover the WGPu as to recover the RGPu from spent fuel.
While the general procedure is for recovering plutonium from a
borosilicate glass host form is almost identical to reprocessing spent fuel to
recover the plutonium, recovering the WGPu from the borosilicate glass does
provide a few additional challenges. Unlike dissolved spent fuel, the dissolved
WGPu-loaded glass solution contains some of the glass-forming elements, such
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as boron, sodium, and silicon. These elements may prove to be a bit of a
problem for the PUREX process as they may build up to appreciable levels in
the organic solvent. In this work, for example, the decontamination factors
for silicon were reduced when the solvent was recycled and used for a second
decontamination cycle compared to a two-cycle decontamination process that
used fresh solvent for both stages (tables B.14 and B.15). This may require the
addition of some head-end processes to remove the silicon (and possibly the
other glass forming elements as well) to the standard PUREX process.
In terms of a chemical barrier to proliferation, borosilicate glass
provides a barrier to the recovery of plutonium that meets or possibly even
exceeds (depending on the complexity of any needed head-end processes).
Borosilicate glass also provides a physical barrier to proliferation by
increasing the amount of material that a would-be proliferator would need to
steal from just a few kilograms of metal (a 'pit') to almost 155 kilograms of
glass (almost 700 kg of glass would be required if a PUREX plant was not
available for the decontamination and not waste recycling were used). With
the addition of cesium or radioactive waste to the glass, borosilicate glass can
provide the same radiation barrier as spent fuel. Borosilicate glass does not,
however, alter the isotopic composition of the plutonium. However, isotopic
dilution of 2 3 9 Pu is not an explicit requirement of the spent fuel standard, and
unless it becomes a part of the standard, then borosilicate glass appears to meet
the Academy's spent fuel standard.
S6.6 Comparison with Other Immobilization Host Forms
In addition to vitrifying the WGPu in borosilicate glass and burning it
in a reactor, the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) is examining
embedding the WGPu in various ceramics. Two of the front-runners for
ceramic host forms are Zircon and monazite. While both of these minerals are
chemically quite durable (which is part of the reason they are being
considered as host forms for WGPu), both minerals are also the primary
sources of a number of rare earths and other elements. As such, commercial
processes have been developed to extract rare earths (and thus actinides,
presumably) from these matrices.
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6.6.1 Recovery of Plutonium from Monazite
Monazite is one of the primary sources of thorium, as well as some rare
earths which can be co-recovered along with the thorium. It has been
suggested that the WGPu can be embedded in monazite, replacing the thorium
in the matrix. As the plutonium is assumed to replace the thorium in the
matrix, it can also be assumed that the plutonium can be recovered by the same
techniques. Two commercial processes for the recovery of thorium from
monazite are listed in section 2.4.2 of this work. Of these two, the sulfuric acid
process 3 will be discussed, as the extracted thorium solution is typically
purified by a solvent extraction process. Thus, it can be expected that the
plutonium-bearing nitric acid solution would be suitable for use as a feed in a
PUREX plant (if desired)
In this process, monazite sands are digested in concentrated sulfuric
acid (93% sulfuric acid) for 4 hours at 210°C to create a water soluble 'dough'.
The monazite sulfates are then dissolved in water, diluted, and the pH is raised
to 1.5 before the thorium (and presumable plutonium) is precipitated by the
addition of oxalic acid. The oxalates are then digested with sodium hydroxide to
form hydroxides (and to allow the recovery of the oxalic acid), which is then
dissolved in nitric acid. The resulting nitric acid solution can then be adjusted
as desired for use as a feed solution in any desired decontamination process
(for thorium, typically a solvent extraction procedure is used).
The processing required to recover plutonium from monazite is
significantly more complicated than for recovering plutonium from
borosilicate glass. Both processes require that the monolith (it is assumed that
the monazite or glass will be formed as large monoliths to increase physical
barrier) be crushed into a powder. However, the sulfuric acid process
requires two additional digestion stages (the sulfuric acid digestion and the
hydroxide digestion of the oxalate cake), as well as an additional precipitation
step before the plutonium would be in a nitric acid solution that could be used
in a PUREX-type decontamination procedure. Thus, monazite would provide a
stronger chemical barrier to proliferation than either borosilicate glass or
3 Barghusen and Smutz. "Processing of Monazite Sands", Ind. Chem. Eng, Dec.
1958. pp. 1754-1755. (B1)
spent fuel. If cesium can be incorporated into the monazite matrix, then
monazite would be able to provide a radiation barrier. Embedding the WGPu in
monazite does not, however, alter the isotopics of the plutonium (no isotopic
barrier).
6.6.2 Recovery of Plutonium from Zircon
Natural zircon is a primary source of both hafnium and zirconium. As
such, a number of processes have been developed to 'crack' zircon. One of the
more straight-forward methods is the alkali fusion method [2.4.3.2], which was
developed by the Ames laboratory. In this process, the zircon would be mixed
with sodium hydroxide and heated in a furnace at 5650C. As the temperature
rises, the melted sodium hydroxide will react with the zircon to form water and
a number of sodium oxides (such as Na2ZrO3 and Na2SiO3). The resulting
porous frit is then ground and leached with water to extract the silicon
(Na2SiO3). The residue is then leached with acid to dissolve the zirconium
(Na2ZrO3) into solution leaving the un-reacted zircon to be re-used.
This process has not yet been used to extract plutonium from a synthetic
zircon. A would-be proliferator would have to do some experiments to
determine where the plutonium is extracted and what other contaminants are
extracted with the plutonium. As with monazite, chemically recovering WGPu
from zircon is more complicated than recovering WGPu from either spent fuel
or borosilicate glass. Also, the recovery of plutonium from zircon is currently
an area of research, and until a process is developed, there will be an
information barrier that a would-be proliferator would have to overcome to
recover the WGPu. Embedding the WGPu in zircon will not provide any
isotopic dilution, and will provide a radiation barrier only if cesium is
incorporated in the zircon matrix.
6..Z Strategies to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Borosilicate Glass
The primary goal of vitrifying the WGPu in borosilicate glass is to
increase the difficulty a would-be proliferator would encounter in trying to
recover the WGPu for use in a nuclear weapon. One of the primary reasons for
studying how a proliferator would go about extracting the WGPu from a host
form is to determine what could be done to complicate the recovery process.
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In order to recover usable WGPu from borosilicate glass (with fission
products and added rare earth elements), the proliferator would need to build
and operate a facility to accomplish the following stages of the CA process:
removing the glass from its container/cask, crushing the glass into a powder,
dissolving the glass in a nitric acid solution, and then decontaminating the
plutonium solution (presumably using a solvent extraction process).
Anything that is done to interfere with or complicate any of these steps will
serve to complicate the recovery of WGPu from borosilicate glass.
6.7.1 Opening the Container
The task of opening the cask or container containing the glass
(whatever the final container for the WGPu glass will be, along with any
overpack, etc... required for storage, transport, or disposal) could be
complicated in a number of ways.
As a first line of defense, either some or all of the casks could be booby-
trapped in such a way that they explode if the cask is cut open. If all the casks
were rigged to explode, it would require a would-be proliferator to take the
time (and effort) to disarm the containers before the recovery process could
begin, or else risk damaging equipment and personnel. This could be quite
expensive if remote handling equipment (which would be needed to overcome
the radiation barrier) were damaged and needed to be replaced or repaired
(especially after the equipment and work area had been contaminated) Also, it
would be harder to conceal the proliferation efforts if there were a lot of
explosions on the site. If only some of the casks were booby-trapped, a would-
be proliferator would wither have to treat all of the casks as rigged or would
have to find some method to determine if a cask had been rigged to explode.
This method would, however, increase the risks associated with the recovery of
the plutonium if it ever becomes necessary. Also, the explosives may be
degraded by exposure to a strong radiation field, which could either render
them more dangerous (which might further complicate the handling and
disposal of the casks) or degrade their effectiveness.
A milder version of this technique would be to rig the containers to emit
a radio signal when opened, or to perhaps fill the containers with some easy-
to-trace gas compound that would be released when the container is opened.
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Both of these mechanisms could be used by a monitoring agency to determine
that a container has been opened as well as to possibly trace the organization
responsible. This type of protection would only work if the proliferator didn't
know of it's existence (locator type systems such as these would be fairly easy
to defeat) and if the proliferator had some reason to fear detection.
6.l.2 Crushing the Glass
Once the glass is removed from its container/cask, it will be necessary
to crush the glass into a fairly fine powder. Two possible ways to complicate
this process are to modify the glass so that it is more difficult to make it into a
fine powder and to modify the glass so that might damage the equipment
crushing it.
In order to make the glass more difficult to crush into a fine powder, it
might be possible to add to the glass matrix (or to the backfill of the canister)
some kind of cementing agent (or glue) that would be activate by pressure or
perhaps by water (if water or an acid solution are used to allow the glass
powder to be pumped around more easily). The purpose of the cementing
agent would be to increase the particle size of the resulting glass powder,
which will decrease the surface area available for the extraction process and
reduce the amount of plutonium extracted from the glass in the first pass.
Perhaps a more feasible technique to complicate the grinding process
would be to include some kind of ultra-hard material (silicon carbide, for
example) in the glass to try to damage the equipment used. If a would-be
proliferator is force to replace or repair the grinding equipment (which
would be contaminated by fission products in the glass), it could slow down the
recovery process as well as increase the cost of recovering the plutonium.
Damaging the equipment would also serve to add additional contaminants to
the plutonium stream (whatever material is ground off of the equipment),
which may or may not effect the decontamination process. Before this is
considered, it would be necessary to determine the effects of adding the ultra-
hard material inclusions on the long-term durability of the glass.
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6.7.3 Acid Dissolution
After the glass is crushed, the plutonium must be extracted from the
glass powder. This can be accomplished by dissolving the glass in a nitric acid
solution. One way to complicate this stage of the recovery process would be to
include some unreacted metals (in a fine powder, perhaps) in the glass matrix
itself. When the glass powder (containing the unreacted metal) comes into
contact with the acid, the metal would react to generate hydrogen, which
would have to be controlled to prevent an explosion.
6.7.4 Solvent Extraction
The final stage of the recovery process is the decontamination stage,
which presumably would be a solvent extraction process, such as the PUREX
process.
One way to complicate the decontamination process would be to add
something to the glass that would form phosphate or sulfate ions in solution, as
these ions tend to interfere with the solvent extraction of plutonium. This
would require a would-be proliferator to either add a head-end strike process
to remove the phosphate or sulfate ions, or to use another process to
decontaminate the plutonium.
Another way to complicate the solvent extraction process would be to
attack the organic solvent. One way this could be done by increasing the
radiation barrier in the glass to accelerate the radiation-induced breakdown of
TBP. Another way would be to coat the glass with an organic that will interact
with the TBP and reduce its affinity for plutonium. To combat these processes,
a would-be proliferator would have to either replace the organic solvent more
often (increasing the cost of the recovery) or add in a process before the
solvent extraction to remove the agent responsible (either the radionuclides
or the organic). How either of these techniques would affect the durability of
the glass would need to be determined.
One last way to complicate the solvent extraction process would be to
increase the relative loading of contaminants to such a degree that an
additional decontamination cycle would be needed. This would probably
require not only increasing the concentration of the contaminant in the
85
glass, but also reducing the loading of plutonium in the glass, and would most
likely increase the cost of vitrifying the plutonium.
6.7.5 Variable Plutonium Loading and the Recovery Process
In order to avoid criticality problems during the recovery process, the
amount of plutonium that can be present in any given piece of equipment
must be kept below the level at which that given plutonium concentration
would be critical (with some margin for safety). By determining this limit for
all of the stages in the recovery process, the maximum recovery rate for the
system as a whole will determined. If the plutonium loading of the glass is a
known, constant value, then the system can be run at near optimum capacity
by feeding the glass into the system so that the plutonium concentration in
the system is at or near the maximum levels.
If the plutonium concentration in the glass is varied, the proliferator
will have to make a decision on how to run the recovery process. One choice
would be to analyze the glass more frequently to determine the plutonium
concentration of the glass and adjust the feed rate of glass into the process to
keep the total plutonium feed rate near the optimum value. If the plutonium
loading was varied for each log, then the proliferator would have to determine
the plutonium level in each log (not an easy task, especially if there is a
radiation barrier in the glass). If the plutonium level in the glass was varied
within a given log, then the proliferator would have to make multiple
measurements of each log in order. Unless a simple technique for
determining the plutonium loading of borosilicate glass is developed, this
additional testing will delay the recovery of the plutonium.
The second operating option available to the proliferator would be to
operate the recovery process using the maximum plutonium level in the glass
to determine the feed rate. This method would have the mean that the
proliferator would not need to continually measure the plutonium
concentration of the glass. However, it would mean operating the recovery
system at a sub-optimal rate, increasing the time required to recover a given
amount of plutonium.
86
In addition to varying the plutonium concentration in the glass, it
would also be possible to alter the concentration of the neutron absorbers in
the glass. As the levels of these absorbers in solution will also affect the
criticality of a given system, varying the levels of the absorbers in the glass
along with the levels of plutonium would further enhance the difficulties
described above. Some of the disadvantages of varying the composition of the
glass are that it would complicate the vitrification process and it would cause
problems with trying to verify the plutonium concentration in the glass.
Vitrifying the plutonium would present similar criticality issues as recovering
it would, which would slow down the vitrification process and probably
increase the cost involved. If the logs are not homogeneous, it would be
necessary to take samples from each log in order to determine the plutonium
concentrations in the log for verification purposes, which would increase the
costs and time requirements associated with verification.
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6.8 Future Work
The proliferation resistance and reversibility of the various options for
the final disposition of weapons-grade plutonium is one of the criteria that
will be used in deciding on a final disposition option for WGPu. While some
progress has been made in this area, a great deal of work remains to be done.
The next step that needs to be taken with this work on borosilicate glass
is to optimize the CA process for recovering plutonium from the glass,
particularly the decontamination phase of the process. Along these lines,
experiments should be done to determine the effect better chemistry control
(such as the addition of reducing agents, etc...) on the solvent extraction
process. Other decontamination processes could be examined as well, such as
ion exchange. Also, work should be done to see if and how the process could be
scaled up to handle larger amounts of material (to determine what would be
required to recover significant quantities of plutonium from borosilicate
glass).
The borosilicate glass formulation used in this work is not the only glass
formulation being considered. These other formulations should also be
examined to determine how to recover the plutonium from them. Similar work
should also be done on the other immobilization host forms being considered
as host forms for WGPu, such as zircon, monazite, and possibly synroc.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Al
Nominal Glass Composition
The glass used for these experiments is basically the ARM-1 frit (with
simulated fission products) to which thorium and rare earth elements have
been added. The thorium oxide fraction of the glass was designed to be 2 wt. %,
as was the fraction of the europium, samarium, and gadolinium.
Table Al: Nominal Glass Composition
Table Al: This table contains the nominal composition of the borosilicate glass
used as the host form is these experiments. The component mass fraction
(fraction) is given in terms of grams X per gram glass. The contamination
factors of the glass are also provided with regards to Th.
element fraction CFTh
Eu 0.0173 0.983
Gd 0.0174 0.989
Th 0.0176 1.000
Sm 0.0172 0.977
Si 0.1998 11.35
Na 0.0660 3.75
B 0.0323 1.835
Nd 0.0470 2.67
Ce 0.0113 0.642
Cs 0.0101 0.574
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Appendix A2
ICP Limits of Detection
The detection limits for the elements used in these experiments are tabulated
below (along with the corresponding wavelengths) in table Al.
Table A2: Spectroflame ICP limits of detection1
Table A2: This table contains the limits of detection for the Spectroflame ICP.
These limits of detection were
at the given wavelength.
determined using a 2 second counting interval
wavelength (nm)
249.773
380.152
381.967
342.247
589.92
430.358
251.611
283.730
detection limit (ppb)
0.6
Note: There was no listed detection limits for either cesium (Cs) or samarium
(Sm)
1Spectro Analytical Instruments. Spectroflame
Aqueous Solutions (2 s) in ppb. Spectro
Fitchburg, MA. (S4)
ICP Limits of Detection in
Analytical Instruments,
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element
B
Ce
Gd
Na
Nd
Th
Appendix A3
Sample MCNP Input Deck
Below is a sample input deck (source file) for the MCNP runs to determine the
compressed critical mass. This input deck is for the non-ideal purex
decontamination case. Note: the statements in brackets are comments that
have been added to the deck listed below for clarity. They are not present in
the input deck.
I---input deck---l
Non-Ideal Purex - Avg. Feed
1 1 -39.00 -1
2 0 +1
1 so 2.50
mode n
imp: n 1 0
kcode 500 1.0 40 80
c ksrc 0 0 0
ml 62149 -0.00010
5000 -0.03446
11023 -0.0425
14000 -0.01179
50120 -0.00024
63000 -0.00010
64000 -0.00009
94238 -0.00011
94239 -0.85072
94240 -0.05260
94241 -0.00209
94242 -0.00020
print
{Defines region 1 - the alloy sphere with density=39}
{defines region outside surface 1. 0 is for vaccuuml
IDefines geometry of surface 1 w/ radius}
{neutron transport model
{neutron importance inside and outside sphere}
{use kcode; 500 particles 80 cycles (ignore first 40)}
{create neutron source -edited out after 1st run}
1wt. % Samarium-149 in alloy}
{wt. % natural Boron in alloyl
{wt. % Sodium-23 in alloy}
(wt. % natural Silicon in alloy}
lwt. % average Fission Products in alloyl
{wt. % natural Europium in alloy}
swt. % natural Gadolinium in alloy}
1wt. % Plutonium-238 in alloyl
jwt. % Plutonium-239 in alloy}
1wt. % Plutonium-240 in alloy}
lwt. % Plutonium-241 in alloy}
{wt. % Plutonium-242 in alloyl}
{comments were included after the print statement, which marks the end of
the input deck (as far as MCNP is concerendl
94
Appendix B
Experimental Results
Table of Contents (Appendix B)
B.1 Extraction Scoping Experim ents ....................................................................... 98
B.1.1 Acid dissolution techniques (scoping experiments) ...................... 98
B.1.1.1 Whole glass - concentrated acid .......................................... 98
B.1.1.2 Acid Dissolution with crushed glass ................................... 99
B.1.2 Alkali fusion techniques ..................................................................... 99
B.1.2.1 Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Fusion -Large Scale ................. 99
B.1.2.2 Sodium Bicarbonate (NaHCO3) Fusion (large batch) ....... 100
B.1.2.3 Potassium Hydroxide (KOH) Fusion ..................................... 100
B.1.2.4 Mixed Alkali (KOH + KHCO3) Fusion....................................101
B.1.2.5 KOH Fusion with crushed glass ............................................ 101
B.1.3 Caustic dissolution with crushed glass .............................................. 102
B.2 Extraction Technique Analysis Experiments .................................................. 103
B.2.1 Acid Dissolution Experiment ............................................................... 103
B.2.2 Alkali Fusion Experim ent .................................................................... 104
B.2.3 Large Scale Acid Dissolution Process (CA process) ........................ 105
B.2.4 Potassium Hydroxide (KOH) Fusion .................................................... 107
B.2.5 Acid Dissolution Parameter Experiments ......................................... 108
B.2.5.1 Acid Concentration I .............................................................. 108
B.2.5.2 Other CA Parameter Experiments ........................................ 109
B.2.6 Crushed Glass in Acid Process (VI) Verification ............................. 110
B.2.6.1 Crushed Glass in Acid Dissolution Process (CA V1)
Protocol .................................................................................................. 110
B.2.6.2 CA Process Verification ......................................................... 110
B.2.7 Crushed Glass - Acid Dissolution Parameter Experiments ............. 112
B.2.7.1 CA Process (Vi) Parameter Experiment ............................. 112
B.2.7.2 CA Process (V1) Parameter Experiment ............................. 113
B.2.7.3 CA Process (V1) Parameter Experiment ............................. 113
B.3 Decontamination Scoping Experiments ........................................................... 113
B.3.1 Precipitation Decontamination Experiments ................................... 114
B.3.1.1 Hydroxide Precipitation ........................................................ 114
95
B.3.1.2 Fluoride Precipitation Process ............................................. 115
B.3.1.3 Phosphate Precipitation Process ......................................... 116
B.3.1.4 2 Cycle Hydroxide Precipitation Process ............................ 117
B.4 Solvent Extraction Scoping Experiments ......................................................... 119
B.4.1 One Cycle PUREX Separation ................................................................ 119
B.4.2 One Cycle PUREX Separation with Acid Wash Stage ........................ 120
B.4.3 Two Cycle PUREX Separation, No Acid Wash, No Recycle ............... 121
B.4.4 Two Cycle PUREX Separation with Solvent Recycle ........................ 122
B.5 Crushed Glass in Acid (V2) Process Confirmation .......................................... 123
B.5.1 Crushed Glass in Acid (V2) Procedure ............................................... 123
B.5.2 CA (V2) Process Confirmation ............................................................. 125
B.6 ICP Experim ents .................................................................................................... 129
B.6.1 ICP Precision M easurem ent ................................................................ 130
B.6.2 Cesium Determination using ICP ........................................................ 131
B.7 Glass Com position Verification .......................................................................... 132
96
List of Tables (Appendix B)
Table B.1 Acid Dissolution Contamination Factors ................................................ 104
Table B.2 Potassium Hydroxide Fusion Contamination Factors .......................... 105
Table B.3 Contamination Factors for Large-Batch CA Process .......................... 107
Table B.4 Potassium Hydroxide Fusion Contamination Factors .......................... 108
Table B.5 CA (Vl) Process - Contamination Factors ............................................. 111
Table B.6 CA (VI) Process - Contamination Factors ............................................. 112
Table B.7 Hydroxide Precipitation Decontamination Factors ............................ 115
Table B.8 Fluoride Precipitation Decontamination Factors ................................. 116
Table B.9 Phosphate Precipitation Decontamination Factors ............................ 117
Table B.10 Analysis of First Stage of Hydroxide Precipitation .......................... 118
Table B.11 Analysis of Second Stage of Hydroxide Precipitation ...................... 119
Table B.12 Analysis of One Cycle PUREX extraction ............................................. 120
Table B.13 Analysis of 1 Cycle + 1 Acid Wash PUREX extraction ........................ 121
Table B.14 Analysis of 2 Cycle PUREX (No Wash, No Recycle) ........................... 122
Table B.15 Analysis of 2 Cycle PUREX with Solvent Recycle .............................. 123
Table B.16 Contamination Factors from Extraction Process ............................... 125
Table B.17 Contamination Factors from Extraction Process ................................ 126
Table B.18 Contamination Factors from Decontamination Process ................... 126
Table B.19 Contamination Factors from Decontamination Process ................... 127
Table B.20 Experimental Efficiencies for CA (V2) Process .................................. 127
Table B.21 Experimental Efficiencies for CA (V2) Process .................................. 128
Table B.22 Decontamination Factors from T1P1 glass runs ................................. 129
Table B.23 Decontamination Factors from T1P2 glass runs ................................. 129
Table B.22 Error Measurement for ICP Measurements ........................................ 131
Table B.23 M easured Glass Com position .................................................................. 132
97
B.1 Extraction Scoping Experiments
The first stage a would-be proliferator would have to complete to
recover WGPu from borosilicate glass is to extract the WGPu from the glass into
solution. Two potential techniques that could be used to do this are to dissolve
the glass in acid (acid dissolution) and alkali fusions. Both of these techniques
were examined. In these initial experiments, only the thorium concentrations
of the product solutions were determined using ICP analysis.
B.1.1 Acid dissolution techniques (scoping experiments)
The initial, scoping, experiments with acid dissolution techniques can
be roughly broken down into two distinct sections: whole glass experiments
and crushed glass experiments. The whole glass experiments were performed
using pieces of glass that were on the order of 1 cc in volume. For the crushed
glass experiments, the glass was crushed into a powder using a ceramic mortar
and pestle. For these initial experiments, only the thorium concentration of
the final solution was determined (using ICP).
B.1.1.1 Whole glass - concentrated acid (3/16/95)
Concentrated sulfuric and nitric acid were used in an attempt to recover
the thorium from the borosilicate glass. Pieces of the glass (approximately 1
cc) were placed in beakers along with 150 ml of concentrated acid (One sample
with concentrated nitric acid and one with concentrated sulfuric acid). The
beakers were covered with watch glasses and left in a small oven overnight at
90 0C. No visible changes in the glass were noticed when the samples were
removed from the oven. The acid was then poured off and saved for analysis.
DI water was added to the beakers, which contained the undissolved glass and
some traces of the concentrated acids, and allowed to stand for just over 2
weeks at room temperature. The water was then poured off and analyzed, and
the remaining glass was dried and weighed. No significant weight changes
were observed in the glass.
The liquid samples were neutralized with sodium bicarbonate, and then
acidified and filtered for ICP analysis. The extraction efficiencies for thorium
were determined to be
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Concentrated nitric acid eth = 8.7 %
Concentrated sulfuric acid eth = 7.8 %
Water Wash (Nitric acid sample) eth = 0.03 %
B.1.1.2 Acid Dissolution with crushed glass (5/22/95)
In order to increase the surface are of the glass exposed to the acid, the
borosilicate glass was crushed by hand using a ceramic mortar and pestle into
a coarse powder. This glass (batch T1P6) was then poured into Pyrex beakers.
To one of these beakers, a 5 vol. % solution of nitric acid was added (26.3:1 acid
solution to glass ratio). Concentrated nitric acid was added to the other sample,
in a 50:1 ratio. The samples were then covered with watch glasses and heated
in an oven for 2 hours at 90'C. The samples were stirred every 30 minutes.
The samples were then filtered (with filter paper) to separate the solution
from the undissolved solids, and the raffinate solutions were then diluted and
filtered for ICP analysis.
Concentrated Nitric Acid (50.5:1 acid/glass) eth = 4.53%
5 vol. % Nitric Acid (26.3:1 acid/glass) eth = 53.8%
LB.1.2 Alkali fusion techniques (scoping experiments)
The initial, scoping, experiments with alkali fusion techniques can be
roughly broken down into two sections: whole glass experiments and crushed
glass experiments. The individual experimental attempts to extract the
thorium from the borosilicate glass using various alkali fusion techniques are
detailed below.
B,1.2.1 Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Fusion -Large Scale (3/16/95)
A large piece of borosilicate glass (from batch T1P3, mass = 5.77 g) was
placed into a ceramic crucible and covered with sodium hydroxide (NaOH)
crystals (approximately 10 g NaOH per gram glass). This mixture was then
heated in the furnace at 4900C for 2 hours. The resulting product appeared to
be a fused solid mass, which rapidly became moist as the sample was allowed to
cool.
NaOH Fusion (large batch) eth = 5.9 %
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B.1.2.2 Sodium Bicarbonate (NaHCO3) Fusion (large batch) (4/13/95)
A small piece of borosilicate glass (0.874 g, batch T1P6) was mixed with
sodium bicarbonate in a 3:1 ratio, alkali to glass. The resultant mixture was
then heated to 4000C for 1 hour, which had no apparent effect. The same
sample was then heated to 500°C and kept at temperature for 2 hours, again
with no apparent results. The sample was then heated to 900'C and kept at
temperature for about half an hour, which was apparently sufficient to melt
the sodium bicarbonate. After cooling for 1 hour, 20 ml of DI water was added
to the mixture. This water was then removed, filtered, acidified, and later
analyzed.
The crucible was allowed to sit for a few days, and then a 5 vol. % nitric
acid solution was added to the mixture to attempt to dissolve the remaining
fusion mixture. The acid-fusion mixture was stirred and any particles that
adhered to the sides and bottom of the crucible were scraped off into solution.
The resulting acid wash was then filtered and acidified in preparation for ICP
analysis.
Sodium Bicarbonate Fusion-water wash eth = 2.4 %
Sodium Bicarbonate Fusion-acid wash eth = 2.5 %
B.1.2.3 Potassium Hydroxide (KOH) Fusion (5/10/95 and 5/15/95)
Approximately 0.6 g of borosilicate glass (T1P5 batch) was placed into a
nickel crucible and covered with potassium hydroxide (KOH). A ratio of 2.5
grams KOH per gram of glass was used. Next, the crucible was heated using a
lab-top furnace until the KOH was melted and then removed from the heat. DI
water was then added to attempt to dissolve the mixture, and the resulting
water solution was filtered and analyzed using ICP.
Potassium Hydroxide Fusion eth = 0.27 %
This experiment was repeated (5/15/95), using 0.2 g glass (T1P5 batch)
and a 10.1:1 ratio of KOH to glass. The crucible containing the mixture was
then heated with the lab-top furnace until the KOH melted. After
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approximately 1 minute (after the melting of the KOH), the crucible was
removed from the furnace and DI water was added to dissolve the fusion. Once
the crucible had cooled, the water solution was poured off and filtered to
recover any undissolved fusion material. The water solution (which will be
referred to as the water wash) was then acidified and prepared for ICP
analysis. The undissolved solids were then recovered from the filter paper and
dissolved in a 5 vol. % solution of nitric acid (this is the acid wash stage).
KOH Fusion (water wash) eth = 0.58 %
KOH Fusion (acid wash) eth = 11.4 %
B.12, Mixed Alkali (KOH + KHCO3) Fusion (5/17/95)
Borosilicate glass (T1P5 batch) was combined in a 10:1 alkali to glass
ratio with a mixture of potassium hydroxide (KOH) and potassium carbonate
(KHCO3) in a nickel crucible. The ratio of KOH to KHCO3 was 3:1. This mixture
was heated, using the lab-top furnace, until the alkali had appeared to melt. At
this time, the mixture appeared cloudy (a milky white, opaque color). The
crucible was left on the furnace until the cloudy color disappeared. The fusion
was allowed to cool slightly before DI water was added to attempt to dissolve the
fusion. The water solution was then filtered and prepared for ICP analysis.
After the water solution had been poured off, a significant amount of the
fusion material remained on the crucible. This material was not removed by
subsequent washes with both DI water and a 5 vol. % solution of nitric acid. It
was removed by a wash with concentrated nitric, but this acid also reacted
with the nickel crucible.
Mixed Alkali Fusion (water wash) eth = 0.29%
B.1.2.5 KOH Fusion with crushed glass (5/22)
Borosilicate glass (batch T1P6) was crushed into a powder using a
mortar and pestle. Approximately 0.5 g of this crushed glass was then mixed
with about 5 g of KOH (alkali: glass ratio = 10:1) in a nickel crucible, which
was subsequently heated using the lab-top furnace in order to form a fusion.
The mixture was allowed to remain on the furnace for 1 minute after the KOH
had melted. At this time, the mixture had become visibly cloudy. The fusion
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was allowed to cool slightly before DI water was added. The water solution was
poured off and stored for analysis (denoted as the water wash). A 5 vol. %
nitric acid solution was added to the crucible to dissolve any remaining
material. This acid solution was also stored for analysis (denoted as the acid
wash). Both these samples were acidified with nitric acid and filtered for ICP
analysis. No thorium was detected in either solution
KOH Fusion (water wash) eth = 0 %
KOH Fusion (acid wash) eth = 0 %
The solids recovered by filtration from the acid wash and water wash
were then dissolved in concentrated nitric acid and heat at 90'C for 1 hour.
These concentrated acid solutions were then filtered and diluted with DI water
for ICP analysis. The solution from the water wash precipitate stream was
analyzed twice (I and II below).
Precipitate stream (water wash) I eth = 48.4 %
Precipitate stream (water wash) II eth = 36.4 %
Precipitate stream (acid wash) eth = 7.77 %
The undissolved solids from the nitric acid dissolution of the water wash
of the fusion were dissolved in concentrated hydrochloric acid (HC1). The HC1
solution, containing the undissolved solids from the water wash stream, was
then heated at 80'C for 1 hour and then filtered to recover undissolved solids.
The HCI solution was then diluted and prepared for ICP analysis.
HCl dissolution eth = 0.78 %
B.1.3 Caustic dissolution with crushed glass (5/24/95)
In this experiment, potassium hydroxide solutions were used to attempt
to dissolve the borosilicate glass. The glass (T1P6 batch) was crushed into a
powder using a ceramic mortar and pestle. Approximately 0.5 g of this crushed
glass was added to 2 Pyrex beakers. Concentrated KOH solution was added to one
of these beakers and a 1M solution of KOH to the other (the concentrated
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solution was actually a saturated solution, at room temperature, of KOH). The
beakers were then covered and heated in an oven at 90'C for 2 hours. After
being removed from the oven, the solutions in the beakers were poured off,
filtered, and prepared for ICP analysis. No thorium concentration was detected
in either sample.
Caustic dissolution, 1M KOH solution eth = 0 %
Caustic dissolution, sat. KOH solution eth = 0 %
B.2 Extraction Technique Analysis Experiments
After the initial scoping experiments had been performed, 2 processes
were chosen for more detailed analysis: acid dissolution of crushed glass with
a 5 vol. % nitric acid solution, and alkali fusion (KOH) with crushed glass.
These experiments were repeated and the product streams were analyzed to
determine the concentrations of zinc (Zn), thorium (Th), cesium (Cs), boron
(B), sodium (Na), europium (Eu), cerium (Ce), barium (Ba), titanium (Ti), and
molybdenum (Mo). This set of elements was chosen from the elements know to
be present in the glass due to their neutron absorption cross sections. This set
of elements, however, was only used for this set of experiments (for
subsequent analyses, the set of elements described in table 3.1 was used)
B.2.1 Acid Dissolution Experiment (6/1/95)
Glass from the T1P6 batch was crushed into a coarse powder with a
ceramic mortar and pestle. This glass was then divided into 2 batches of
approximately 1 gram and placed in Pyrex beakers. A 5 vol. % solution of
nitric acid was then added to the beakers. The acid solution to glass ratio for
the first sample was 36.9:1, and 23.4 for the second. The beakers were then
covered with a watch glass and placed into an oven. The beakers were heated
at 90'C for 2 hours, and were stirred every 30 minutes. The acid + glass slurry
was then filtered with filter paper to separate the liquid from the undissolved
solids. The liquid samples were then diluted and filtered for ICP analysis.
When determining the thorium extraction ratio, the initial weight of the
solution was used (instead of the weight of the solution remaining after the
sample is heated), as the weight of the solution before filtering was not
recorded.
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5 vol. % nitric acid (acid:glass = 36.9)
5 vol. % nitric acid (acid:glass = 23.4)
eth = 86.9 %
eth = 81.4 %
The contamination factors of the nitric acid solution were also determined.
Table B.1 Acid Dissolution Contamination Factors
Table B.I1: This table contains the contamination factors determined for the
initial acid dissolution experiments on borosilicate glass.
element
Cs
B
Na
Eu
Ce
Zn
Ba
Ti
Mo
(acid:glass = 36.9)
0.41
2.48
5.52
1.24
0.69
0.99
0.41
0.88
0.64
(acid:glass = 23.4)
0.47
2.77
6.71
1.40
0.74
1.09
0.46
0.80
0.59
B,2.2 Alkali Fusion Experiment (6/1/95)
Crushed borosilicate glass (T1P6) was combined with KOH in a nickel
crucible and heated with the lab-top furnace until the KOH had melted. The
crucible was left on the furnace for 1 minute after the KOH had melted and
then was allowed to cool. After cooling slightly, 5 vol. % nitric acid was added
to dissolve the fusion (hot acid wash). The acid solution was then recovered
and filtered for ICP analysis. Another wash of 5 vol. % nitric acid was added to
the crucible to dissolve the remaining material (cold acid wash). This solution
was also filtered and analyzed using the ICP. The material recovered from the
filters and from the crucible was then dissolved in concentrated nitric acid,
which was diluted and filtered for ICP analysis (designated as crucible stream
and filter stream).
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(fl 1) KOH Fusion (hot acid wash)
(f2) KOH Fusion (cold acid wash)
(f3) Precipitate (crucible stream)
(f4) Precipitate (filter stream)
eth = 0.1 %
eth = 27.4 %
eth = 4.7 %
eth = 8.9 %
The contamination factors for these samples were also determined. In table
B.2, an asterisk by the number indicates that the concentration of the element
fell outside the calibration range of the ICP (and was estimated by the ICP). An
asterisk instead of a number indicates that the concentration of a given
element was below the detection limit of the ICP.
Table B.2 Potassium Hydroxide Fusion Contamination Factors
Table B.2: This table contains the contamination factors calculated from ICP
concentration measurements on the KOH fusion solutions. The stream
designations are provided above. An asterisk next to a number indicates that
the ICP measurement was outside the calibrated region and was estimated by
extending the calibration. An asterisk instead of a number indicates that the
ICP measured a concentration that was zero or less (possible due to straight
line calibration curves)
element
Cs
B
Na
Eu
Ce
Zn
Ba
Ti
Mo
fli
*
1247.*
10142.*
*
*
205.7
436*
*
436*
f2
0.38
1.53*
10.36*
1.12*
0.81
0.60
0.38
0.86*
0.46
*
0.89
0.57
0.57
0.27
*0
*
0.56
*
f4
0.28
0.30
0.50
1.03
0.64
0.69
0.46
1.99
*
B.2.3 Large Scale Acid Dissolution Process (CA process) (6/7/95)
In order to generate material for the decontamination scoping
experiments (and to determine the effects of an increase in scale on the CA
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process), the CA process (Crushed glass in Acid) was repeated with
approximately 3 grams of crushed borosilicate glass (T1P4 batch). A 5 vol. %
nitric acid solution was added to a Pyrex beaker containing the crushed glass
in a 30:1 acid solution to glass mass ratio. The sample was then heated in an
oven for 2 hours at 90'C, and was removed for stirring (with a stirring rod)
every 30 minutes. The resulting solution was then filtered to recover the un-
dissolved material and stored for analysis and use in the decontamination
experiments. As this solution was used as the 'stock' solution for the
decontamination scoping experiments, it was analyzed a number of times. The
results of each analysis of this solution are given below along with the date
the ICP analysis of the solution. The average and standard deviation of the
results were also determined.
(xl)
(x2)
(x3)
(x4)
(x5)
(x6)
CA process-large batch (6/21/95)
CA process-large batch (6/28/95)
CA process-large batch (7/11/95)
CA process-large batch (7/11/95)
CA process-large batch (7/26/95)
CA process-large batch (7/31/95)
CA process-large batch (Average)
- standard deviation
The contamination factors were also determined
the large batch CA process sample.
eth = 75.4 %
eth = 72.7 %
eth = 83.7%
eth = 84.0 %
eth = 83.1%
eth = 81.4 %
eth = 80.1 %
= 4.8%
in most of these analyses of
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Table B.3 Contamination Factors for Large-Batch CA Process
Table B.3: This table contains the contamination factors (CF's) observed in the
final product solution of the large-scale CA process experiment. The CF's were
calculated from the observed concentrations for each of the ICP runs. The
average of the measurements is also provided (AVG).
element 6/28 7/11 7/26 7/31 AVG.
Ce 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.60
Eu 1.02 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.94
Gd 1.10 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.01
Sm 1.14 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.05
Nd 3.16 2.72 2.80 2.81 2.87
Cs 2.47 2.23 2.19 1.98 2.22
Si 0.41 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.36
Na 5.91 4.38 4.40 4.33 4.76
B 2.53 2.29 2.24 2.24 2.33
B.2.4 Potassium Hydroxide (KOH) Fusion (6/8/95)
The KOH fusion experiment was repeated. A KOH/borosilicate glass
fusion (10:1 by mass) was formed by mixing KOH pellets with crushed
borosilicate glass. This mixture was heated using the lab-top furnace until the
KOH had melted and until any visible reaction had stopped. The mixture was
then removed from the furnace and allowed to cool slightly before DI water
was added to dissolve the fusion. This solution was then filtered and prepared
for ICP analysis (water wash). Then, a 5 vol. % solution of nitric acid was added
to the crucible to dissolve any remaining material. This solution was also
recovered, filtered, and prepared for ICP analysis (acid wash). The material
recovered on the filters from both the acid and water wash were then
dissolved in concentrated nitric acid (acid wash precipitate stream and water
wash precipitate stream, respectively). No thorium (above the limit of
detection) was detected in either the acid or water wash stream. The observed
contamination factors for the precipitate streams are given in table B.4.
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KOH Fusion (water wash)
KOH Fusion (acid wash)
Precipitate (water wash)
Precipitate (acid wash)
eth = 0%
eth = 0%
eth = 15.3 %
eth = 6.4%
Table B.4 Potassium Hydroxide Fusion Contamination Factors
Table B.4: This table contains the contamination factors determined for the
precipitate streams from the KOH fusion with crushed borosilicate glass.
Precip. (water wash)
0.65
0.75
0.84
0.88
2.79
2.15
0.03
0.24
0.23
Precip, (acid wash)
0.50
0.53
0.67
0.74
2.76
2.06
0.28
0.38
0.30
B.2.5 Acid Dissolution Parameter Experiments
In order to optimize the crushed glass is nitric acid dissolution process
(CA process), a number of experiments were performed to determine the effect
of varying certain parameters such as acid concentration, particle size, re-
using crushed glass, temperature, etc...
B.2.5.1 Acid Concentration I (6/19/95)
This set of experiments was the first done to examine the effect of acid
concentration on thorium extraction efficiency. Two solutions were examined:
1 vol. % concentrated nitric acid and 10 vol. % concentrated nitric acid. These
acid solutions were added to crushed glass in a 30:1 mass ratio (acid:glass), and
the resulting solutions were heated for 2 hours at 90'C. The solutions were
stirred every 30 minutes during the heating. After 2 hours, the samples were
filtered with filter paper to remove the undissolved solids and the solutions
were prepared for ICP analysis.
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element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
1 vol. % Nitric acid eth = 7.02%
10 vol. % Nitric acid eth = 39.5%
B.2.5.2 Other CA Parameter Experiments (6/21/95)
Two additional parameters in the CA process were examined: the effect
of stirring the solution during heating and the re-use of the crushed glass. To
determine the effects of stirring the mixture, the CA process was repeated
using 5 vol. % nitric acid solution in a 30:1 mass ratio with the crushed glass.
The solution was heated to 90'C for 2 hours, but it was not stirred every 30
minutes. The solution was then filtered and prepared for ICP analysis.
CA Process: No Stirring eth = 10.8%
To determine the extraction efficiency of a second extraction phase, the
undissolved glass from the 6/1/95 experiment (the sample with the acid:glass
ratio of 36.9) was used instead of 'fresh' glass in the CA process. Again, 5 vol.
% nitric acid was used in a 30:1 mass ratio to the glass. The samples were
heated for 2 hours at 90'C, and were stirred every 30 minutes. The sample was
then filtered and prepared for ICP. Two extraction ratios were determined for
this sample. The first is the additional extraction efficiency gained by adding
a second extraction phase, and is the ratio of the recovered thorium from the
second extraction to the total thorium present in the virgin glass.
Additional Extraction Efficiency eth = 2.2%
The second extraction efficiency calculated was the ratio of the total thorium
recovered to the thorium remaining in the used glass after the first extraction.
This was done assuming that all of the thorium not recovered in the first
extraction remained in the glass.
Second Stage Extraction Efficiency eth = 11.3%
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B.2.6 Crushed Glass in Acid Process (Vl) Verification
After the initial experiments with crushed glass in nitric acid,
experiments were performed to determine the effectiveness of the extraction
procedure.
B.2.6.1 Crushed Glass in Acid Dissolution Process (CA VI) Protocol
The initial protocol for the Crushed Glass in Acid process (CA process)
was as follows.
1) The glass sample was crushed in a coarse powder using a ceramic mortar
and pestle.
2) The crushed glass was put in a beaker and a 5 vol. % solution of nitric acid
(approximately 3.5 wt. % nitric acid) was added in a 30:1 mass ratio (acid:glass).
3) The sample was stirred and covered with a watch glass before being placed
in the oven.
4) The samples were then heated in an oven for 2 hours at 90'C. Every 30
minutes, the samples were removed from the oven for stirring.
5) After 2 hours, the samples were weighed and then were filtered to remove
the undissolved glass using filter paper. The liquid sample was then filtered
again and diluted for ICP analysis.
B,2.6.2 CA Process Verification (7/24/95)
The CA process (V1) was used to extract thorium from three samples of
T1P1 glass (samples A, B, and C). However, instead of separating the solution
from the undissolved glass by filtering with filter paper, the supernate
solution was recovered by decanting off the liquid phase (using a pipette).
5 vol. % Nitric acid (A) eth = 30.8%
5 vol. % Nitric acid (B) eth = 32.4%
5 vol. % Nitric acid (C) eth = 32.5%
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The contamination factors were determined below.
Table B.5 CA (Vi) Process - Contamination Factors (batch 1)
Table B.5: This table contains the contamination factors for the first batch of
experiments to confirm the results from the CA (VI) process.
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
A
0.82
1.75
1.78
1.99
4.41
3.50
0.97
6.82
3.72
B
0.84
1.79
1.84
2.06
4.48
3.58
0.93
6.92
3.74
C
0.82
1.80
1.79
2.05
4.44
3.67
0.93
6.89
3.69
This experiment was repeated (7/26/95 and 7/30/95). On 7/26/95, glass from
the T1P1 batch was used, following the CA (V1) protocol. On 7/30, glass from
both the T1P1 and T1P5 batch were used in the CA (V1) protocol. For these
experiments, however, the glass was ground into a much finer powder than
before. The analysis of these experiments is given below.
T1P1 glass 7/26 (D)
T1P1 glass 7/30 (sl)
T1P1 glass 7/30 (s5)
eth = 38.8%
eth = 44.0%
eth = 32.2%
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CA (Vl)
CA (V1)
CA (V1)
Table B.6 CA (V1) Process - Contamination Factors (batch 2)
Table B.6: This table contains the contamination factors for the second batch
of experiments to confirm the results from the CA (Vi) process.
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
D
0.69
1.57
1.53
1.78
3.45
3.21
0.82
5.31
2.75
sl
0.77
1.49
1.50
1.71
3.74
2.90
0.65
5.72
2.94
s5
0.98
1.99
2.08
1.91
4.55
3.25
0.97
6.69
3.54
111 
Crushed
(~1ass - Acid Dissolution Parameter Exneriments (take 2~
In order to try to find out what had caused the dramatic change in the
extraction efficiency of the CA (V1) process experiments were performed to
examine the effects of acid concentration, oven temperature, and particle size
on extraction efficiency.
B.2.7.1 CA Process (VD) Parameter Experiment: Acid Concentration (8/11/95)
Thorium was extracted from crushed T1P1 glass following the protocol
given for the CA (V1) process [B.2.6.1]. However, instead of using a 5 vol. %
nitric acid solution, the acid concentration was varied. The three samples
were heated in the same oven in order to minimize the possible effects of any
temperature fluctuations (the samples should all see the same temperature).
Acid concentrations of 5 vol. %, 10 vol. %, and 25 vol. % nitric acid were used.
5 vol. % Nitric Acid solution
10 vol. % Nitric Acid solution
25 vol. % Nitric Acid solution
eth = 84.8%
eth = 83.4%
eth = 84.4%
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B.2.7.2 CA Process (VI) Parameter Experiment: Temperature (9/1/95)
Thorium was extracted from crushed T1P1 glass following the protocol
given for the CA (VI) process [B.2.6.1]. However, instead of trying to maintain
the oven temperature at 90'C, the oven temperature was varied. Two different
temperatures were used, 80'C and 1000 C, with one sample at each temperature.
The results of these two experiments, along with the 5 vol. % nitric acid run
from the acid concentration experiments (8/11/95) [B.2.7.1], are shown below
CA (VI) Process: 80 0C eth = 98.9%
CA (VI) Process: 90°C (8/11/95) eth = 84.8%
CA (VI) Process: 1000C eth = 100.6%
B.2,7.3 CA Process (VI) Parameter Experiment: Particle Size (10/27/95)
Thorium was extracted from crushed T1P1 glass following the protocol
given for the CA (Vi) process [B.2.6.1]. The crushed glass was then separated
by particle size into 5 groups, listed below. The glass from each group was
then used in the CA (VI) protocol to determine the effects of particle size on
extraction efficiency. The size categories are listed in terms of the mesh of the
screens that the particles passed through and stopped on. For example, the
group 25 mesh > X > 60 mesh refers to glass particles that passed through the 25
mesh screen but did not pass through the 60 mesh screen.
X > 25 mesh eth = 28.2%
25 mesh > X > 60 Mesh eth = 47.3%
60 mesh > X > 80 Mesh eth = 57.0%
80 mesh > X > 120 Mesh eth = 59.5%
X < 120 Mesh eth = 44.5%
B.f Decontamination Scoping Experiments
Using the product solutions from the acid dissolution (CA or Crushed
glass in Acid) process, a number of decontamination techniques were tried in
order to purify the thorium stream. As thorium was used as an analog for
plutonium, it was not possible to test the decontamination of REDOX (reduction-
oxidation) processes, such as the lanthanum fluoride process [2.6.1.6] and the
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bismuth phosphate process [2.6.1.2]. The initial experiments involved
precipitation processes (modeled after the REDOX processes, but without the
reduction or oxidation stages). Subsequent decontamination attempts involved
a solvent extraction process (PUREX - see section [2.6.2.1])
B.3.1 Precipitation Decontamination Experiments
For these experiments, the product solution from the large batch CA
process [B.2.3] was used as the feed stream. In addition to the contamination
factors (CF's) of the product streams and the decontamination factors (DF's) of
the process, the recovery efficiency (rth) [3.2.5.2] was also determined for
each process examined.
B.3.1.1 Hydroxide Precipitation (6/12/95)
Using a IM solution of KOH, the feed solution was titrated to pH = 5.8 in
order to precipitate thorium hydroxide (similar to the separation stage of the
caustic soda process for cracking monazite [2.5.2.1]). The solution was filtered
and the precipitate was recovered. After drying, the precipitate was dissolved
in 5 vol. % nitric acid. This solution was then filtered and analyzed.
Hydroxide Precipitation rth = 49.3%
The contamination factors (CF) and decontamination factors for the process
are shown in table B.7.
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Table B.7 Hydroxide Precipitation Decontamination Factors
Table B.7: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
decontamination factors (DF) for the hydroxide precipitation decontamination
experiment.
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
CF
0.21
0.80
0.84
0.84
1.64
0.63
0.47
0.11
0.57
DF
3.14
1.27
1.31
1.36
1.93
3.93
0.87
53.24
4.41
B.3.1.2 Fluoride Precipitation Process (6/13/95)
A saturated solution of sodium fluoride (NaF) was added in a 1:1 ratio to
the feed solution in order to precipitate out thorium fluoride (essentially the
first stage of an LaF decontamination process [2.6.1.6] without the lanthanum
ion for a carrier). The solution was then heated at 80'C for 1 hour, stirring
every 30 minutes, before it was filtered to recover the precipitate.
The paper filter and filtrate were allowed to dry overnight. Then the
precipitate was recovered and dissolved in concentrated nitric acid. The acid
solution was then heated for 1 hour at 80 0C. After it was heated, it was diluted
with DI water and filtered for ICP analysis.
Fluoride Precipitation
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rth = 10.9%
Table B.8 Fluoride Precipitation Decontamination Factors
Table B.8: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
decontamination factors (DF) for the fluoride precipitation decontamination
experiment.
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
CF
2.73
2.10
1.78
3.39
6.49
1.81
1.95
5.98
0.31
DF
0.24
0.48
0.62
0.33
0.49
1.36
0.21
0.99
8.20
B.3.1.3 Phosphate Precipitation Process (6/14/95)
A saturated phosphate ion (P04-) solution was added to the feed solution
in a 1:1 mass ratio to precipitate the thorium out of solution. The mixture was
heated for 1 hour at 80'C before it was filtered to recover the precipitate.
After drying overnight, the precipitate was recovered from the filter paper
and dissolved in concentrated nitric acid. After heating the concentrated acid
solution for 1 hour at 80'C, DI water was added and the solution was filtered and
prepared for ICP analysis.
Phosphate Precipitation
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rth = 25.3%
Table B.9 Phosphate Precipitation Decontamination Factors
Table B.9: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
decontamination factors (DF) for the phosphate precipitation decontamination
experiment.
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
CE
0.83
1.39
1.47
1.57
4.25
1.48
0.03
0.21
0.13
DF
0.78
0.73
0.75
0.72
0.75
1.66
14.23
27.94
19.48
B.3.1.4 2 Cycle Hydroxide Precipitation Process (7/5/95)
Using a IM solution of sodium hydroxide (NaOH), approximately 15 g of
the feed solution was titrated to a pH of around 5.8 in order to precipitate out
thorium hydroxide. The resulting solution was then filtered to recover the
precipitate, and the precipitate was recovered from the filter paper. The
recovered precipitate was dissolved in 5 vol. % nitric acid. Samples of this
solution and the raffinate solution were taken for ICP analysis. The process
was then repeated with the dissolved precipitate as the feed solution. The
recovery efficiencies of each stage were
1st Stage Raffinate solution
1st Stage Precipitate solution
2nd Stage Raffinate solution
2nd Stage Precipitate solution
rth = 1.4%
rth = 56.9%
rth = 0.71%
rth = 74.7%
Note that the second stage efficiencies were determined relative to first stage
precipitate stream (which was used as the feed for the second stage), not to the
initial feed stock solution.
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The contamination factors (CF's) and decontamination factors (DF's) were
determined for each stage. For the first stage, the CF's and DF's are given in
table B. 10.
Table B.10 Analysis of First Stage of Hydroxide Precipitation
Table B.10: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
Decontamination factors (DF) for the raffinate and precipitate streams of the
first stage of the hydroxide precipitation process.
Raffinate
CF
21.18
16.41
19.20
21.51
80.70
97.03
0.74
315.23
109.38
DF
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.45
0.01
0.02
Precipitate
CF DF
0.22 2.59
0.63 1.41
0.66 1.47
0.65 1.54
1.37 1.98
0.64 3.46
0.35 0.95
0.09 50.34
0.45 5.11
For the second stage, the CF's and DF's are given in table B.11. For some of the
values, the measured concentrations were zero (below detection limits for the
given concentration range). They are recorded here with asterisks (*). The
decontamination factors shown below are relative to the feed stream for the
second stage (the 'product' stream from the first stage).
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element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
Table B.11 Analysis of Second Stage of Hydroxide Precipitation
Table B.11: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
Decontamination factors (DF) for the raffinate and precipitate streams of the
second stage of the hydroxide precipitation process.
Raffinate
CF
0.08
* **
* **
1.01
0.53
2.30
11.42
52.91
66.78
DF
2.75
* **
*.**
0.65
2.58
0.28
0.03
0.01
0.01
Precipitate
CF DF
0.23 0.97
0.63 1.01
0.66 1.00
0.68 0.97
1.44 0.95
0.65 0.99
1.48 0.24
0.01 12.16
0.02 26.66
B.4 Solvent Extraction Scoping Experiments
Using the solution from the CA (V1) process as a feed solution, a number
of experiments were performed to evaluate the effectiveness of a solvent
extraction process in purifying the plutonium analog stream. These
experiments involved a crude version of the PUREX process [2.6.2.1]. The
product solution from the 7/24/95 CA (VI) process experiments [B.2.6.2] was
acidified to approximately 3M HNO3 through the addition of concentrated
nitric acid and then used as the feed solution for these solvent extraction
scoping experiments.
B.4.1 One Cycle PUREX Separation (8/2/95)
Approximately 30 g of feed solution (sample A, [B.2.6.2]) was placed in a
250 ml glass bottle with a screw-on cap (henceforth referred to as a shaker).
An approximately equal volume of 30 vol. % TBP in kerosene solution was
added, and the mixture was shaken vigorously by hand for 1 minute. The
solution was then allowed to settle until the organic and aqueous phases had
separated. Then, the organic phase was transferred to another shaker using a
disposable pipette.
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element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
An equal volume of DI water was then added to the organic, and the
mixture was shaken for 1 minute. After it had settled, the organic was again
separated off using a disposable pipette. The water solution was then acidified
to approximately 10 % nitric acid through the addition of concentrated nitric
acid and filtered for ICP analysis. The calculated contamination and
decontamination factors are displayed below in table B.12, and the recovery
efficiency was
1 Cycle PUREX extraction rth = 47.2%
Table B.12 Analysis of One Cycle PUREX extraction
Table B.12: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
decontamination factors (DF) from the one cycle PUREX extraction experiment,
as well as the feed stream CF's.
element Feed CF CF DF
Ce 0.88 0.05 17.69
Eu 1.79 0.20 9.06
Gd 1.83 0.19 9.69
Sm 2.03 0.22 9.29
Nd 4.46 0.34 12.97
Cs 3.55 0.21 16.59
Si 0.53 >0.01 <50.0
Na 6.83 0.26 26.39
B 3.63 0.11 31.58
B. One Cycle PUREX Separation with Acid Wash Stage (8/9/95)
Approximately 20 g of feed solution (sample A, [B.2.6.2]) was placed in a
shaker with an equal volume of 30 vol. % TBP in kerosene solution. After being
shaken by hand for 1 minute, the organic and aqueous phases were allowed to
separate. The organic phase was then transferred to another shaker using a
disposable pipette. An equal volume of 3M HNO3 was then added to the
organic, and the mixture was shaken for 1 minute. After settling, the organic
was transferred to a third shaker, where it was mixed with DI water to recover
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the plutonium analog. The mixture was shaken for 1 minute and allowed to
settle before the organic phase was removed. The resulting aqueous solution
was then acidified to approximately 3M HNO3 and filtered for ICP analysis. The
recovery efficiency and decontamination factors are given below.
1 Cycle + 1 Acid Wash PUREX rth = 29.2%
Table B.13 Analysis of 1 Cycle + 1 Acid Wash PUREX extraction
Table B.13: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
decontamination factors (DF) from the one cycle PUREX extraction with one
acid wash stage experiment, as well as the feed stream CF's.
Feed CF
0.88
1.79
1.83
2.03
4.46
3.55
0.53
6.83
3.63
CE
0.01
0.06
0.06
0.09
0.14
>0.01
0.05
0.18
0.05
DF
88.0
28.92
29.54
22.82
32.42
<300.0
10.17
37.77
67.82
BA.3 Two Cycle PUREX Separation, No Acid Wash, No Recycle (8/18/95)
Approximately 25 g of feed solution (sample A, [B.2.6.2]) was placed in a
shaker with an equal volume of 30 vol. % TBP in kerosene solution. After being
shaken by hand for 1 minute, the organic and aqueous phases were allowed to
separate. The organic phase was then transferred to another shaker using a
disposable pipette, where it was mixed with DI water to recover the plutonium
analog. The mixture was shaken for 1 minute and allowed to settle before the
organic phase was removed. The resulting aqueous solution was then acidified
to approximately 3M HNO3. This process was then repeated.
2 Cycle PUREX, no wash, no recycle rth = 10.2%
121
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
Table B.14 Analysis of 2 Cycle PUREX (No Wash, No Recycle)
Table B.14: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
decontamination factors (DF) from the two cycle PUREX extraction (with no
acid wash stage and no solvent recycle) experiment, as well as the feed stream
CF's.
element Feed CF CF DF
Ce 0.88 0.05 17.53
Eu 1.79 0.21 8.63
Gd 1.83 0.19 9.39
Sm 2.03 0.21 9.47
Nd 4.46 0.32 14.00
Cs 3.55 0.24 15.03
Si 0.53 0.01 82.35
Na 6.83 0.34 20.04
B 3.63 0.16 23.09
B.4.4 Two Cycle PUREX Separation with Solvent Recycle (8/23/95)
Approximately 20 g of feed solution (sample A, [B.2.6.2]) was placed in a
shaker with an equal volume of 30 vol. % TBP in kerosene solution. After being
shaken by hand for 1 minute, the organic and aqueous phases were allowed to
separate. The organic phase was then transferred to another shaker using a
disposable pipette, where it was mixed with DI water to recover the plutonium
analog. The mixture was shaken for 1 minute and allowed to settle before the
organic phase was removed. The recovered organic was saved for use in the
second cycle.
The aqueous solution from the first cycle was acidified to 3M HNO3, and
then the recovered organic was returned to the shaker. After 1 minute of
vigorous shaking, the mixture was allowed to settle. Then the organic phase
was separated from the aqueous phase and transferred to another shaker. The
thorium was then stripped from the organic phase by adding DI water,
shaking the resulting mixture for 1 minute, and then recovering the aqueous
phase. The recovered aqueous solution was then acidified to 3M HNO3, and
filtered for ICP analysis.
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2 Cycle PUREX with solvent recycle
Table B.15 Analysis of 2 Cycle PUREX with Solvent Recycle
Table B.15: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) and
decontamination factors (DF) from the two cycle PUREX extraction with solvent
recycle experiment, as well as the feed stream CF's.
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
B 5 
Crushed
Feed CF
0.88
1.79
1.83
2.03
4.46
3.55
0.53
6.83
3.63
CF
0.05
0.16
0.15
0.17
0.31
0.23
0.02
0.37
0.19
DF
17.47
11.35
11.91
12.01
14.25
15.46
31.73
18.31
19.44
Glass in Acid (V2~ Process Confirmation
As a result of the experiments with the parameters of the CA process,
the procedure was revised. This revised procedure was then run on glass from
two different batches five times on each batch, in order to determine the
effectiveness of the process. The revised procedure and the results of the
confirmation experiments are provided in this section.
B.5.1 Crushed Glass in Acid (V2) Procedure
The revised procedure for the extraction and subsequent
decontamination of thorium (plutonium) from borosilicate glass is detailed
below.
1) The glass sample was crushed using a ceramic mortar and pestle so that it
passes through a 60 mesh filter (particle size less than 250 microns)
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rth = 19.7%
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2) The crushed glass was put in a beaker and a 25 vol. % solution of nitric acid
(approximately 17.87 wt. % HNO3) was added in a 30:1 mass ratio (acid:glass).
3) The sample was stirred and covered with a watch glass before being placed
in the oven.
4) The samples were then heated in an oven for 2 hours at 90 0 C. Every 30
minutes, the samples were removed from the oven for stirring.
5) After 2 hours, the samples were weighed and then the liquid solution was
decanted off using a disposable pipette leaving the undissolved glass in the
beaker. A small portion of this sample was taken, filtered and diluted for ICP
analysis.
6) The remaining sample was then added to a glass bottle (shaker) and mixed
with an equal volume of pre-equilibrated 30 vol. % TBP in kerosene. The pre-
equilibrated organic solution was prepared by mixing the TBP+kerosene
mixture with an equal volume of 3M nitric acid.
7) The sample was then shaken for 1 minute and allowed to settle. The organic
phase was recovered with a disposable pipette and transferred to a clean
shaker.
8) An equal volume of 3M nitric acid was then added to the organic solution.
The mixture was then shaken for 1 minute and allowed to settle before the
organic solution was again recovered and transferred to a clean shaker with a
disposable pipette.
9) The organic solution was then mixed with an equal volume of DI water and
shaken for 1 minute. After settling, the organic phase was removed, leaving
only the aqueous solution. The aqueous phase was then acidified to
approximately 3M HNO3 by the addition of concentrated nitric acid. This
sample was then filtered and diluted for ICP analysis.
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B.5.2 CA (V2) Process Confirmation
Using the CA (V2) procedure, thorium was extracted and purified from
borosilicate glass. The glasses examined were ARM-1 glass, with thorium and
rare earths added, from batch TIP1 and T1P2 (made by K. Sylvester, ref. S5).
For each glass used, five experiments were done. In order to prevent
confusion, the contamination factors determined in these experiments are
shown below, first for the extraction process and then for the
decontamination process. The experiment designation is given for each
experiment.
Table B.16 Contamination Factors from Extraction Process
Table B.16: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) from the
extraction process of the CA (V2) procedure for the T1P1 glass. The column
titles are the experimental designations of each of the experiments
element LA LB MA MC N1
Ce 0.627 0.645 0.623 0.614 0.626
Eu 1.071 1.084 1.061 1.032 1.050
Gd 1.005 1.014 0.990 0.987 0.988
Sm 1.138 1.167 1.138 1.137 1.121
Nd 2.301 2.327 2.318 2.228 2.476
Cs 2.156 2.176 2.088 2.086 1.957
Si 0.162 0.139 0.125 0.118 0.104
Na 4.181 4.276 4.067 4.019 3.774
B 2.007 2.047 2.016 1.940 2.050
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Table B.17 Contamination Factors from Extraction Process
Table B.17: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) from the
extraction process of the CA (V2) procedure for the T1P2 glass. The column
titles are the experimental designations of each of the experiments
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
N2
0.681
1.034
1.036
1.140
2.701
2.079
0.172
4.164
2.246
01
0.674
1.041
1.052
1.144
2.743
2.031
0.165
4.061
2.263
02
0.682
1.041
1.049
1.144
2.721
2.069
0.149
4.052
2.258
PB
0.684
1.070
1.056
1.157
2.782
2.099
0.135
4.421
2.253
PC
0.684
1.062
1.047
1.150
2.735
2.060
0.151
4.341
2.251
Table B,18 Contamination Factors from Decontamination Process
Table B. 18: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) from the
decontamination process of the CA (V2) procedure for the T1P1 glass. The
column titles are the experimental designations of each of the experiments
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
LA
0.020
0.053
0.048
0.057
0.073
0.106
0.010
0.058
0.026
LB
0.012
0.031
0.029
0.034
0.034
0.073
0.009
0.017
0.004
MA
0.024
0.082
0.069
0.081
0.098
0.082
0.027
0.058
0.029
MC
0.019
0.059
0.050
0.059
0.070
0.069
0.008
0.046
0.021
NI
0.028
0.106
0.090
0.103
0.148
0.130
0.044
0.058
0.055
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Table B.19 Contamination Factors from Decontamination Process
Table B.19: This table contains the contamination factors (CF) from the
decontamination process of the CA (V2) procedure for the T1P2 glass. The
column titles are the experimental designations of each of the experiments
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
N2
0.019
0.061
0.055
0.062
0.092
0.065
0.008
0.040
0.032
o01
0.014
0.049
0.045
0.049
0.074
0.057
0.004
0.008
0.029
02
0.049
0.116
0.109
0.120
0.216
0.158
0.013
0.135
0.119
PB
0.034
0.120
0.100
0.124
0.176
0.141
0.001
0.087
0.054
PC
0.014
0.049
0.044
0.048
0.058
0.058
0.001
0.003
0.011
The extraction efficiencies and recovery efficiencies were also determined for
these experiments. For the experiments with the glass from the T1P1 batch,
the extraction and recovery efficiencies, along with the mean and 97.7 %
confidence interval (2 standard deviations), are given below
Table B,20 Experimental Efficiencies for CA (V2) Process
Table B.20: This table contains the extraction and recovery efficiencies
calculated for the CA (V2) experiments with glass from the T1P1 batch. Also
included is the arithmetic mean and the 2 standard deviation confidence limit
(spread) of the data.
exD. ID
MA
MC
LA
LB
N1
AVG.
Spread
Eth
89.21%
95.76%
88.51%
88.91%
91.15%
90.71%
6.00%
Rth
24.60%
33.17%
33.37%
28.50%
32.12%
30.35%
7.53%
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The extraction efficiencies and recovery efficiencies wvere also determined for
these experiments. For the experiments with the glass from the T1P2 batch,
the extraction and recovery efficiencies, along with the mean and 97.7 %
confidence interval (2 standard deviations), are given below
Table B.21 Experimental Efficiencies for CA (V2) Process
Table B.21: This table contains the extraction and recovery efficiencies
calculated for the CA (V2) experiments with glass from the T1P2 batch. Also
included is the arithmetic mean and the 2 standard deviation confidence limit
(spread) of the data.
exp. ID Eth Rth
N2 85.98% 32.12%
01 86.44% 35.46%
02 86.90% 23.75%
PB 87.83% 31.65%
PC 83.63% 27.31%
AVG. 86.16% 30.06%
Spread 3.14% 7.89%
The Decontamination factors botained with the solvent extraction (1 + 1)
process were determined from the ratio of the contamination factor of a given
element in the feed stream (the 'product' of the extraction process) and the
contamination factor of hte element in the product solution of the
decontamination process. These decontamination factors are shown below in
tables B.22 and B.23.
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Table B.22 Decontamination Factors from T1P1 glass runs
Table B.22: This table contains the decontamination factors (DF) from the
decontamination process of the CA (V2) procedure for the T1P1 glass. The
column titles are the experimental designations of each of the experiments
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
LA
30.69
20.19
20.77
20.06
31.50
20.34
16.72
72.24
76.07
LB
55.19
35.24
35.10
34.20
68.09
29.65
15.26
244.36
568.02
MA
26.36
12.98
14.25
13.98
23.62
25.53
4.64
70.32
69.84
Mc
32.98
17.48
19.56
19.28
32.04
30.44
14.74
86.82
92.76
Nil
22.53
9.89
10.97
10.86
16.73
15.11
2.38
24.53
37.43
Table B.23 Decontamination Factors from T1P2 glass runs
Table B.23: This table contains the decontamination factors (DF) from the
decontamination process of the CA (V2) procedure for the T1P2 glass. The
column titles are the experimental designations of each of the experiments
element
Ce
Eu
Gd
Sm
Nd
Cs
Si
Na
B
N2
35.46
16.98
18.73
18.32
29.48
32.12
22.77
105.10
71.00
01
48.45
21.31
23.37
23.37
37.16
35.71
39.58
537.45
79.34
02
13.83
9.00
9.59
9.50
12.60
13.13
11.54
30.01
19.04
PB_
20.28
8.90
10.54
9.30
15.78
14.86
116.52
51.09
41.88
PC
50.30
21.86
23.61
23.91
47.48
43.06
1498.21
1608.49
210.92
I.6 ICP Experiments
This section details two sets of experiments to determine the accuracy
and precision of the ICP for elements in question in this work in the sample
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matrix. The first experiment was to determine the error associated with the
ICP measurements. The second experiment examined a technique for
eliminating the effects of the cerium interference in the determination of
cesium.
B.6.1 ICP Precision Measurement (10/18/95)
To determine the error associated with the ICP concentration
measurements in this work, the following experiment was performed. Three
standards were created, containing all 10 elements examined in this work. The
concentrations of these standards were 10 ppm, 5 ppm, and 1 ppm. These
standards were then used to create an ICP method (which was also used for the
final confirmation experiments[B.5] ). Each standard was measured 5 times. A
Gaussian distribution of the measurements was assumed, and the standard
deviation of the data was determined using the techniques presented in
Tsoulfanidis (T2) 1 . The 97.7% confidence intervals (2 standard deviations) at
10 ppm, 5 ppm, and 1 ppm for each element are provided below.
1Tsoulfanidis presents a summary of the statistics and error propagation
techniques in chapter 2 of his text (ref. T2).
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Table B.22 Error Measurement for ICP Measurements
Table B.22: This table contains the 97.7 (2 standard deviation) confidence limits
on the relative errors associated with concentrations measured by ICP. The
relative error, shown as a percentage of the mean concentration, associated
with the concentration measurements was determined at 10 ppm, 5 ppm, and 1
ppm for the elements examined.
element 10 ppm 5 ppm 1 ppm
Ce 3.75 % 4.55% 3.92%
Th 3.58% 3.93% 3.31%
Eu 2.61% 3.19 % 3.17 %
Gd 2.92% 3.80% 3.43%
Sm 4.18% 5.72 % 4.23%
Nd 2.45% 2.28% 5.34%
Cs 3.85% 8.36% 44.21%
Si 4.45% 2.13 % 9.51%
Na 3.81% 3.79% 9.49%
B 2.60 % 2.07 % 7.63 %
B.6.2 Cesium Determination using ICP
In analyzing the experimental data it was discovered that there was a
problem with the cesium measurements (over 200% of the cesium present in
the glass was extracted into solution). This discrepancy was eventually
attributed to a spectral interference from cerium. While there is an
interference-free line to use in determining cerium concentrations there is
no such line for cesium. To compensate for this it was proposed to measure the
apparent cesium concentration due to cerium and determine a correlation
between cerium concentration and apparent cesium concentration. Then by
subtracting the apparent cesium concentration (due to the cerium
interference) form the observed cesium concentration it would be possible to
determine the actually cesium concentration.
In the process of calibrating the ICP to measure cesium (without the
additional cerium interference), it was discovered that without the cerium it
was not possible to identify the cesium peak above the background for the
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calibration range of interest (1 to 10 ppm). While it may be possible to use
more concentrated samples to determine the cesium concentration these
samples were not archived, due to problems associated with storing samples
containing organics (previous archived samples from the PUREX scoping
experiments had seriously degraded the sample containers).
B.7 Glass Composition Verification
The Pacific National Laboratory (PNL) procedure number APSL-03 (see
Appendix C3) was used to attempt top verify the composition of the borosilicate
glass from the T1P1 batch. The procedure was done twice, on 8/1/95 and
8/8/95. The measured composition of the glass from each experiment, the
average experimental composition, and the nominal composition of the glass
(Appendix Al) are compared below.
Table B.23 Measured Glass Composition
Table B.23: Using the APSL-03 procedure [C3], the composition of the TIP1 glass
was determined. The measured compositions are shown below along with the
average of the two measurements and the assumed (nominal) composition.
element 8/11 8AVG, nominal
Ce 1.012% 0.717% 0.865% 1.13%
Th 1.310% 0.847% 1.079% 1.76%
Eu 1.417% 1.373% 1.395% 1.73%
Gd 1.451% 1.369% 1.410% 1.74%
Sm 1.647% 1.625% 1.636% 1.72%
Nd 3.994% 3.801% 3.898% 4.70%
Cs 2.906% 2.445% 2.676% 1.01%
Si 19.03% 19.683% 19.357% 19.98%
Na 6.768% 7.255% 7.012% 6.60%
B 3.265% 3.267% 3.266% 3.23%
Discrepancies between the observed composition and the nominal, or
predicted, composition can most likely be attributed to laboratory error, as
there were difficulties dissolving and accounting for all of the alkali fusion
(i.e. small bits of the fusion would stick to the crucible, or were splashed on
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the outside of the crucible). The observed cesium fraction, which is higher
than expected (the only element that was observed to be above the predicted
fraction), can be attributed to problems encountered in using the ICP to
measure cesium concentrations in the presence of cerium. Cerium provides a
spectral interference at the only wavelength available for determining
cesium concentrations.
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Appendix C1
Principles of Inductively Coupled Plasma (ICP) 1
Below is a lab document posted in the ICP room at MIT, which describes the
principles of inductively coupled plasma (ICP) analysis. ICP was used in the
work presented here to determine the concentration of selected elements in
solution.
Principles of ICP (Inductively Coupled Plasma)
by Kevin Hsueh, MIT. 1991. (H1)
1) A peristaltic pump ensures a steady flow rate of the sample.
2) The sample is introduced with a nebulizer which injects aerosols into the
argon stream entering the plasma.
3) Argon gas flows through an open tube, the end of which is concentrated
with RF coil which sets up an oscillating electromagnetic (EM) field.
4) A few argon ions are generated using an igniting device. These charged
ions are caught by the oscillating EM field and try to follow the
direction of the field.
5) This causes the ions to oscillate rapidly, which in turn results in the ions
colliding with more argon atoms. These atoms then become ionized,
generating secondary ion pairs of argon ions and electrons.
6) The number of ions rapidly increases until a steady state is reached. This
constitutes a plasma.
7) When sample atoms are introduced into the plasma, they collide with the
rapidly moving argon ions and become themselves excited.
1Hsueh, Kevin. Principles of ICP. Lab procedures No. 41. 1/11/93. (H1)
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8) The excited sample atoms and ions pass through the plasma, relax to lower
energy states, and emit characteristic photons.
9) A spectrometer measures the intensity of certain selected photon
wavelengths.
10) After calibration, chemical elements can be determined by their
characteristic wavelengths.
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Appendix C2
ICP Equipment Settings and Measurement Parameters
The following equipment settings and measurement parameters were used for
all ICP measurements (unless otherwise noted) performed as part of these
experiments
Coolant Temperature:
Argon Pressure:
Coolant Flow
Nebulizer Pressure:
Pre-flush Time:
High Flush Time:
Pump Speed:
Measurement Time:
Pump Speed:
# of Measurements:
150C
100 psi
40
3.3 bar (cross-flow nebulizer)
45 s
20 s
3 (high flush)
100
2 (for measurements)
3
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Appendix C3
Glass Composition Verification 2
The procedure used to determine the final glass compositions, originally used
at MIT by Anthony Brinkley (B4), was originally taken from PNL (Pacific
National Labs) procedure number APSL-03. This procedure uses a potassium
hydroxide (KOH) fusion to dissolve the glass; this fusion is subsequently
dissolved in a hydrochloric acid (HCI) solution. This concentrations of all
constituent elements in the glass, except for potassium, can then be
determined by measuring the concentrations of the constituents in the
resulting solution.
The glass was crushed using a ceramic mortar and pestle until it would
pass through a 140 mesh (the original procedure calls for an alloy tool steel
mortar and pestle). The crushed glass was weighed out to 0.25 +/- 0.075 grams
and placed in a nickel crucible. Approximately 1.8 (+/- 0.4) grams of KOH were
added to the nickel crucible. 0.2 +/- 0.1 grams of potassium nitrate (KNO3)
were added to the crucible to further facilitate the dissolution of the glass into
the fusion. The contents were then swirled until the ground glass sample
mixed with the flux.
Approximately three minutes were needed to melt the KOH pellets, and
the total melt time was ten minutes. The crucible was then removed from the
burner and allowed to cool to room temperature. De-ionized water (DI water),
approximately 10 ml, was added slowly to the crucible to dissolve the cake-like
melt. Once dissolved, the liquid was transferred to a 250 ml volumetric flask.
This was repeated until all of the melt in the crucible was dissolved. After the
transfer (transferred) was completed, the solution in the flask was diluted to
approximately 100 ml total volume using DI water. The solution was then
acidified using 25 +/- 5 ml of concentrated HCQ acid. The solution was swirled,
and if any precipitate remained undissolved in solution, 0.3 +/- 0.1 grams of
oxalic acid crystals were added. The flask was then filled to the 250 ml mark
with DI water.
2 the glass composition verification procedure was taken from Brinkley,
Anthony L. Master's Thesis. MIT. June 1994. (B4)
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Appendix C4
Operation of the ICP3
SETTINGS
Coolant Temperature:
Argon Pressure:
Coolant Flow:
Nebulizer Pressure:
150C
100 psi
40
Cross-flow: 3.3 bar Ultrasonic:
Torch Position: the coil of the three tubes should be 1-2 mm below the coil
Nebulizer Pressure Adjustment
Cross-flow:
Ultrasonic:
use 1000 ppm Na solution; adjust small orange flame to be
just above the top coil
use 100 ppm Na; adjust to be even with coil
Nebulizers:
Cross-flow
less accurate and sensitive
can handle samples with larger amounts of dissolved solids
sturdier and more reliable
Ultrasonic
more sensitive (x10)
easily clogged
prone to breakdowns
3 Sautman, Mark. Operation of the ICP.
Cerefice, 9/95. (Sl)
Laboratory Document. 1993. Revised by
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3.6 bar
SAMPLES AND STANDARDS
NEVER RUN UNFILTERED SAMPLES IN ICP!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Filter solutions with syringe filters <1.0 micron
Standards and cleaning solutions do not have to be filtered if made with DI
water
Acidify standards and samples to 5 vol. % HNO3
Make standards by diluting ICP standards, available from PlasmaChem.
Do not use AA standards.
Watch out for matrix interferences (e.g. NaC1) which can affect the readings
use consistent matrixes in standards and samples
If the standards/samples are stored for more than a few weeks, visually
examine the solutions for algae or other biological growths
Do not leave solutions uncovered for long periods of time - dust and
other particles can fall in
Make sure containers are clean. Never place a sample in a container
which previously contained sand or other solids.
Use wipes (Kimwipes, etc...) to clean off sample tube when switching
between samples, standards, blanks, etc...
OPERATIONS
Startup and shutdown procedures are posted on the ICP and are included at the
end of this document. If the ICP is off, you will have to put the system into
stand-by mode before following the ICP START procedure. This is done by
pressing the <STAND-BY> key.
WATCH THE FLAME DURING IGNITION. If the flame is not tall and narrow,
but instead is short fat, and contained within the tube, PRESS STOP OR
STANDBY IMMEDIATELY! You have had a reverse discharge, and have
only about 3 seconds before the torch is melted. Melted torches can be re-
blown by Precision Glassblowing in CO.
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Reprofile before each use. If not prompted by the ICP, select the option under
the F3 functions (press <F3> to get into the menu). Do this before preparing a
new method or before recalibrating an existing method. Also you may need to
do this again occasionally during operation. If you do reprofile, you will have
to recalibrate the ICP afterwards. During reprofiling, the flame will dim and
the power will drop to 1000.
Always have solution running through the nebulizer. Use DI water
or 5 vol. % nitric acid if no samples are being run. Do no operate with just air!
Power should be 1200 except when reprofiling the ICP.
Run your standards every 4-5 samples to check the calibration of the ICP. If
your concentrations are drifting, recalibrate the ICP, using the RECALIBRATE
option in the <F3> menus.
Standard deviations should be below 1% except at low concentrations. See
troubleshooting section if above 2 %.
Ultrasonic Nebulizer
Start in STANDBY mode. Wait until the condenser and desolvator lights come
on before turning on operate.
Operate with the lid closed. If the lid is opened, the desolvator light will
typically go off in a few minutes. Do NOT stay in OPERATE mode when the
desolvator light is off or the transducer can overheat.
Do not stay in OPERATE mode if no solution is misting because the transducer is
no longer being cooled down by the water.
Make sure that the cross-flow pump is not running. Press <PUMP> to turn it
off.
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PROGRAM CREATION
Menus at the top of the screen are accessed by pressing <ALT> and the first
letter of the command. Use <RETURN> to indicate choices or to move to the next
parameter. Use <F9> to enter the data and go to the next screen.
For the most part, the ICP itself will prompt you to the next step. You may have
to wait, as the ICP computer is fairly slow. If nothing appears to be
happening, press <Return> so that the ICP will know that you are ready for the
next step.
Creation of a Program to Determine Concentrations
1) Press <F2> to see the menu.
2) Select CREATE
3) Select CREATE NEW
4) Select QUANTITATIVE
I. INITIALIZATION
1) Enter Method Name
II. LINE SELECTION
1) Choose ANALYZE LINE
2) Choose element
3) Choose proposed lines. Press <F5>. Look for disturbances from other
elements that may be present in the samples.
4) Choose the wavelength. Avoid wavelengths where the numbers are in
red or dark red.
5) Enter the scan name (usually, the element name is used)
6) Scan solution. Allow 45 seconds of pumping for the solution to reach
the flame before starting the scan with <F12>.
7) Enter the element.
8) Center the cursor on the line in the spectrum (if prompted). Press <F9>
9) Accept line and measurement time with <F9>
10) For multi-elemental procedures, repeat steps 1-9 until all elements have
been selected.
11) End select line
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III. STANDARD SAMPLES
1) Create new sample file.
2) Enter File Name.
3) Enter standard sample names. Store with <F9>
4) Enter Concentrations with units. Store with <F9>
IV. MEASURE PARAMETERS
1) Select Measurement parameters:
Preflush time: 45 s High Flush Time: 15 s Pump Speed: 3
Meas. Time: 100 Pump Speed: 2
# of Measurements: 5
NOTE: Set Pump speeds to 0 if using the ultrasonic nebulizer
2) Select Input Data. Sample Name: y
3) Select Output Data.
The following are all yes: print, avg., single meas., sample ID, conc.
unit, negative conc. allowed
4) Exit parameter.
V. MEASURE STANDARDS
Follow prompts. Start measurements with <F12>
After each standard has been measured, press <F6> to get the average. Then
press <F9> to store the result. Then press <F4>, as prompted, to go to the next
standard.
VI. REGRESSION
1) Press <RETURN> to accept element.
2) Examine deviations
3) Press <F2> to look at the graph of the regression. Press <ESC> to return.
4) If regression is not acceptable, press <F2> for other regression options.
5) If regressions are acceptable, press <F9>
VII. END CREATING
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To use an existing method
1) Reprofile the ICP (in <F3> menu) before recalibrating.
2) Use the <F2> key to get into the menus. Go to ANALYZE main menu.
3) Select quantitative method. Enter method name by using the <PAGE UP>
and <PAGE DOWN> keys to move through list of methods
4) Once method has be loaded, you must recalibrate it (if not prompted by
ICP). Recalibrate the method using RECALIBRATE option in <F3> menu.
5) Run some of your standards to check the calibration. It may be
necessary to recalibrate the ICP again.
Qualitative Scans
These are used to determine if a given element is present, but not what the
concentration is. The height of the peak does NOT necessarily represent the
magnitude of the concentration.
Choose element and wavelength
Allow 45 seconds of pumping for the solution to reach the flame before
starting the scan with <F12>
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ICP START Procedure4
(1) Switch on exhaust system. (Note: this is usually left on)
(2) Check cooling water level.
(3) Open closing valve of argon tank. Record argon pressure.
(4) Switch on water cooling system.
(5) Tighten tension on sampling tubes.
(6) Check coolant flow rate (press <+>). Then press <STOP> key.
(7) Check nebulizer pressure (press <->). Then press <STOP> key.
(8) Check torch position and clearance.
(9) Press the <START> key.
(10) Watch ignition of the plasma. If there is a problem, you will
have only 3 seconds to stop the ignition before melting the
torch.
(11) Switch on pump (press <PUMP> key) and flush the system with DI water
or a 5 vol. % solution of nitric acid for 15 to 30 minutes.
(12) Write down the start time, sample description, and argon pressure in the
ICP room log book.
4 Hsueh, Kevin. ICP start up and shutdown procedures. Lab document #42.
5/24/94. (H2)
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ICP STOP Procedure 5
(1) Flush the system with DI water or a 5 vol. % solution of nitric acid for 10
minutes.
(2) Press the <STOP> key.
(3) Close the closing valve on the argon tank. Record the argon pressure.
(4) Switch off exhaust system. (Note: this system is usually to be left on)
(5) Release tension in the sampling tubes.
(6) Wait 5 minutes. Then shut off the water cooling system.
(7) Write down stop time, argon pressure, and initial the ICP room log book.
Note:
If the ICP has not been used recently, it will most likely have to be brought
into stand-by mode before beginning the start-up procedures. This is done by
pressing the <STAND-BY> key. If the ICP will not be used for some time, it
should be shutdown. To do this press the <STAND-BY> key after completing the
ICP STOP procedures.
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5ibid. (H2)
